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Abstract:  
 In this thesis I focus on what, if any, philosophical implications for a 
 conception of the self follow from the psychological and neurological 
 study of dementia. After comparing different types of conceptions of the self 
 and the expression they have found in philosophical examinations of 
 dementia, I argue that the most pertinent philosophical theory of the self is 
 Heidegger‟s‟ conception of Dasein. This conception is found to be 
 illuminating particularly when it comes to understanding the changes in the 
 experiential dimensions of someone suffering from dementia. 
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1. Introduction 
 The word “dementia” comes from the Latin stem, demens which literally 
 means without mind.
1
 
There is no doubt that dementia is one of the diseases that can affect people which 
causes the greatest amount of distress to the person afflicted, fas well as their riends 
and family. It affects both body and mind, typically causing a gradual deterioration, 
until both memories are lost and the body is feeble. Dementia also has no cure; it may 
be slowed down, but invariably leads to death. That is not to say that a meaningful life 
is not possible with dementia. Friends, family and other carers may aid in creating a 
framework within which losing some of one‟s mental faculties is less distressing. But 
there is no doubting the terrible implications of the possibility of gradually and 
irreversibly losing one‟s mind. These reflections are commonly taken for granted. 
However, the conceptual implications of dementia as a very real aspect of the human 
condition for the study of philosophy have not been as widely explored as one might 
expect, given the commonness of the condition. In this thesis I will attempt to 
elucidate the implications of the scientific study of dementia for a philosophical 
theory of the self.  
Here a question of method arises. After all, philosophy has traditionally stayed well 
away from empirical scientific investigations; philosophy explores the conceptual, 
while science explores the practical and observable. However, I venture that this 
theoretical division is not congruent with philosophical development. Indeed, as the 
empirical study of the mind develops, insights can be gained into the conceptual 
composition of man: 
Throughout most of our history, philosophy has seen itself as being independent of 
empirical investigation. It is that aspect of philosophy that is called into question by 
results in cognitive science. […] Cognitive science – the empirical study of the mind 
                                                        
1
 Alistair Burns, ”Dementia: a twentieth century historical overview”, In Psychiatry in the Elderly, 
Third Edition, Edited by Robin Jacoby and Catherine Oppenheimer, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 513. 
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– calls upon us to create a new, empirically responsible philosophy, a philosophy 
consistent with empirical discoveries about the nature of mind.
2
 
Now, it has commonly been taken for granted that the seat of the mind is in the brain. 
So, I venture that it should follow that the science of the brain, neurology, should 
have implications for the philosophical theories of man. For although the 
philosophical theory will often be argued to be the foundation of the empirical 
science; one cannot lay a foundation without knowing what structure stands upon it. 
Furthermore, I will show that dementia, as one of the most complex and profound 
possibilities for man, has certain implications for what theories of the human self are 
feasible. 
But this is not to say that philosophical theory cannot be illuminating for the scientific 
study of the mind. Indeed, whereas science seeks to categorize and quantify, 
philosophy of the self aims at explaining the fundamental structure which allows any 
experience. As a source of centuries of philosophical theories on the human self and 
experience, philosophy can in relation to dementia provide tools for comprehending 
what it might mean for a self to live with dementia. Here I will argue that the 
methodological tools of philosophy are invaluable. Moreover, I will argue that the 
philosophy of the self and scientific study of dementia are mutually illuminating.  
Furthermore, in this thesis I will ask, and answer, a series of questions regarding the 
relationship between the self and dementia. In general I will ask, in the light of an 
examination of dementia, what constitutes a feasible theory of the self? Is the self 
something one has, or does not have? Or is it merely a fictional concept? In what way 
do the embodied mind and the self relate to one another? What explanatory value 
does a phenomenological interpretation of dementia have? Can it aid our 
understanding of someone suffering from dementia? 
Now, in order to examine the philosophy implications of dementia, we must first have 
an initial understanding of what dementia is. I will therefore in chapter 2 introduce 
dementia; provide an overview of the symptoms, a brief description of the empirical 
study of the brain, and a description of some of the various dementia conditions. This 
survey will form the basis for our interpretation of the philosophy of dementia.    
                                                        
2
 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the flesh, (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 15. 
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After this, I shall examine four distinct types of philosophical theories of the self, and 
their recent applications in the philosophy of dementia. In chapter three I will 
examine an identity conception, exemplified by Locke and Kant, and a no-self 
conception, exemplified by Hume. Following this I shall turn to a critical examination 
of the applications of these types of theories of the self in the philosophy of dementia. 
Chapter four will follow the same structure, introducing a narrative and a 
phenomenological conception of the self, and critically examining applications in the 
literature of these theoretical frameworks for interpreting the philosophical 
implications of dementia.  
After this I will in chapter five turn to my preferred methodological tool: Heidegger‟s 
conception of Dasein. This examination will focus on Heidegger‟s theory in Being 
and Time; more particularly the ontical/ontological distinction and the existential 
constitution of Dasein. I will then in chapter six use this methodological framework of 
Dasein in order to interpret the implications of dementia for the human self. By using 
this interpretation, we avoid addressing problems such a subject/object distinction, 
and questions concerning whether something is real or not real. In short, I will argue 
that the theory of Dasein allows us to take a leap into the experiential dimension of 
dementia. 
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 2: What is dementia?  
2.1 Initial characterisation and symptoms 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief characterisation of dementia. This will 
give us the necessary background knowledge to discuss how dementia affects the self. 
Specifically, this description will attempt to furnish a preliminary understanding of 
dementia, focusing on the psychiatric symptoms, the pathological finds and supposed 
neurological causes of the disease. It will also attempt to give an insight into how we 
connect the most common symptoms of the various forms of dementia with their 
underlying neurological cause. Due to the complicated nature of the subject matter, 
and limitations of space, I will not attempt to give a comprehensive description of the 
different dementia conditions, but rather offer a broad overview, which seeks as much 
to show the complicated nature of our inquiry. For the time being we will also 
proceed without questioning the epistemological status of these mainstream 
psychological, psychiatric and neurological accounts.  
I will start by giving a brief description of the kind of symptoms associated with 
Dementia. Secondly, I will give a brief introduction to the neurological organisation 
of the brain, including the supposed localisation of certain cognitive functions, 
including memory, after which we will be in a position to understand the progression 
of the various forms of dementia. Thirdly, I will describe the most common form of 
dementia, Alzheimer‟s disease in more detail. Fourthly, I will give a brief overview of 
the other types of dementia and how they differ pathologically and symptomatically 
from Alzheimer‟s.  
A natural place to start when characterising a disease is the International 
Classification of Diseases, or ICD, published by the World Health Organisation. 
According to the ICD: 
Dementia (F00-F03) is a syndrome due to disease of the brain, usually of a chronic or 
progressive nature, in which there is disturbance of multiple higher cortical functions, 
including memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, learning 
capacity, language, and judgement. Consciousness is not clouded. The impairments of 
cognitive function are commonly accompanied, and occasionally preceded, by 
deterioration in emotional control, social behaviour, or motivation. This syndrome 
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occurs in Alzheimer's disease, in cerebrovascular disease, and in other conditions 
primarily or secondarily affecting the brain.
 3
 
 
In short, dementia can be characterised as a disease of the brain, which leads to the 
progressive weakening of higher mental functions, such as memory, speech, planning 
and emotional control. Which functions are weakened and to what degree depend 
particularly on the type of dementia, how far the disease has progressed, and 
individual variation. Indeed, the only way to unequivocally diagnose someone with 
Alzheimer‟s disease, the most common type of dementia, is a post-mortem 
examination of the brain.  However, simply put, the symptoms of dementia are lasting 
memory loss along with at least the deterioration of one other cognitive function. It is 
also important to note that the person is not delirious, i.e. he or she is fully conscious.  
So although there is a lot of variation when it comes to the progression of dementia, 
as with any type of disease, there is a set of symptoms that frequently occur. These 
can be divided into cognitive symptoms, behavioural symptoms, and motor 
symptoms. Frequent cognitive symptoms include impaired attention, impaired 
learning skills, memory loss, aphasia (language problems), apraxia (loss of ability to 
carry out practical functions), agnosia (impaired ability to recognise sounds, persons 
and things), the impaired ability to orientate in space, and impaired intellectual 
abilities.
4
 All these various abilities can also be divided into sub-categories, and they 
also interact in various ways. This is especially clear when it comes to memory-loss, 
which as the most common symptom for dementia, and the common denominator, 
will be discussed in more detail below.  
We can divide the behavioural symptoms into, depression, anxiety, delusions, 
hallucinations, changing personality, apathy, restlessness, irritability, aggression, 
shouting etc.
5
 These symptoms will of course vary according to type of dementia, loss 
of cognitive functions, individual personalities, the sufferer‟s environment, attitude of 
friends, family and caregivers etc. For example impaired ability to produce coherent 
sentences for a person who prides himself/herself on their language skills might cause 
                                                        
3
 World Health Organisation,  International Classification of Diseaseases (IDC10). Chapter 5 Mental 
and Behavioural Disorders (F00-F99) World Health Organisation, 2007 
[http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/] (visited 20.03.2010) 
4
 Knut Engedal and Kristian Haugen, Lærebok: Demens Fakta og utfordringer, (Sem: Nasjonalt 
kompetansesenter for aldersdemens, 2004), 42. 
5
 Ibid, 42. 
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depression and withdrawal. And while it is comparatively easier to quantify and 
diagnose the cognitive symptoms, these behavioural symptoms require a better 
understanding of the personality of the individual in question. Finally, we have the 
impaired motor functions, which include impaired ability to control muscle 
movements, and incontinence. Before we proceed to a characterisation of the different 
dementia conditions, we will look briefly at our understanding of the brain.  
2.2 Studying the brain and its functions 
 In order to understand why we associate these symptoms with dementia and how 
dementia progresses, we need to turn to our understanding of the brain. It is 
commonly taken for granted, with good cause, that the brain is what allows us to 
speak, think, feel, understand, and reason. Now, as we will see in the next few 
chapters there are many different philosophical theories about how the self is 
constructed, and what connection this has with our physical composition and 
cognitive endowments, but in order to have a basis to investigate this we must first 
look at how our brain is composed and how that connects with our mental faculties.  
Modern neuroscientists have been able to describe where in the brain many of our 
cognitive capacities are located. This has been done in mainly three different ways: 
firstly, by dissecting the brain, thereby mapping out its gross structure, and internal 
organisation, down to the examination of individual cells. Secondly, by studying 
patients who have brain damage in a certain area of the brain, and studying which 
functions are impaired. Thirdly, by getting patients to perform tasks while using 
modern image techniques like commuted tomography (CT) and 
electroencephalography (EEG) to attempt to study what parts of the brain are 
particularly active when the various tasks are being performed.  
This research has shown us that the brain is a connection of approximately 15-35 
billion neurons, commonly called brain cells. There are approximately 150 different 
types of neurons, but they operate in more or less the same way. Two parts of the 
neuron are especially important for our survey, the dendrites, and the axons. These are 
what connect the different neurons together. The dendrites are part of a neuron‟s cell 
body and receive “input” in the form of neurotransmitters. The neurons can 
communicate by firing an electric current through their axon, which releases specific 
neurotransmitters, depending on the type of neuron, to another neuron‟s dendrites. 
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Furthermore, the brain consists of glia cells (astrocytes and oligodendrocytes), which 
support the neurons and their axons, allow for the right levels of neurotransmitters to 
be available, and section off parts of the brain that become damaged.  
Furthermore, modern neuroscientists divide the brain into massive collections of 
neurons, called nuclei, which have often been found to perform specific functions; for 
example the primary visual cortex right at the back of the brain, which first receives 
inputs from the eye channelled through the lateral geniculate nucleus in the thalamus, 
and starts putting together the mental image we commonly call seeing. While neurons 
from any nuclei often communicate with many other nuclei, there are also large 
axonal pathways, through which a lot of neurological communication takes place, for 
example from the primary motor cortex right at the top of the brain all the way down 
to the spinal cord, where other neurons carry on the message and make the muscles 
perform specific functions. So for some types of functions, specific neurotransmitters 
are important to relay messages in the brain. The production of these 
neurotransmitters can be inhibited in different ways due to dementia, which literally 
slows our reactions and limits cognitive functions. Furthermore, the brain has also 
been found be dividable into sections; the older (evolutionarily) functions, such as 
those controlling heart rate and breathing, located closer to the brain stem, and the 
higher order mental functions such as memory, vision, and executive functions, 
located towards the brains outer rim: the cortex.  
The cortex is commonly divided into four lobes: frontal, parietal, occipital and 
temporal. In the frontal lobe, behind the forehead, the brain takes care of executive 
functions, such as planning an act, and also arguably houses our personalities. The 
parietal lobe towards the top of our brain receives information from touch and helps 
us coordinate in space. The occipital lobe at the back of the brain is mainly concerned 
with vision. The temporal lobe contains, among other things, the limbic system, 
which is particularly involved in learning and memory.  
So, we have a broad overview of what parts of the brain are involved in the different 
cognitive functions we employ. However, it must be stressed that these nuclei never 
work in isolation, and never is that more true than when it comes to memory.  
Memory is often differentiated into three different types – working memory, long-
term memory, procedural memory – and these types of memory interact with each 
12 
 
other, and individually connect different parts of our brain and other cognitive 
functions. While there are different theories as to specific locations of memory 
functions and how they interact, the most important areas for long-term memories are 
located in the hippocampus and the surrounding areas, located in the temporal lobe of 
the brain. Furthermore, the frontal lobe, where most executive functions are thought 
to be based, is very much involved with working memory.
6
  
As we have seen in our initial characterisation of dementia the most important 
diagnostic criterion is memory loss, although other symptoms might precede this. In 
order to diagnose cognitive deficits, particularly memory loss, doctors interview the 
person, and the person‟s family. The questions aim to ascertain the level and degree 
of behavioural changes, motor difficulties and cognitive deficiencies, as well as the 
impact on the primary care-givers.
7
 Central to this examination is a Mini Mental 
Status (MMS) test, which tests the patient‟s memory and other cognitive functions on 
a scale from one to thirty. Many of these questions revolve around ascertaining short 
and long time memory loss: such as: which year is it? What date is it? And testing a 
patient‟s short term memory by asking them to remember the names of three objects. 
Along with other tests this can give us indication of what kind of memory loss has 
taken place, and also tests other cognitive functions in order to ascertain how the brain 
has become effected by the disease. 
2.3 The different dementia diseases 
Based on this information about the symptoms of dementia and the structure of the 
brain we can now come to a basic understanding of dementia as a disease, and how 
the physical symptoms in the brain can lead to the symptoms we can observe. To 
begin with, we will focus on Alzheimer‟s disease. The two distinguishing 
pathological finds in a patient with Alzheimer‟s disease are neurofibrillary tangles and 
neuritic plaques. Neurofibrillary tangles develop inside the cells, as two and two 
parallel running tau protein fibres become tangled together. This process hinders 
normal transport within the cells which leads to cell death. These tangles usually 
occur in the cortex, the limbic system and some areas of the brain stem.
8
 Neuritic 
                                                        
6
 Michael Passer et al., Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behaviour, (London: McGraw-Hill 
Higher Education, 2009), 374.  
7
 Engedal and Haugen, Lærebok: Demens Fakta og utfordringer, 256. 
8
 Ibid, 65. 
13 
 
plaques, on the other hand, develop outside the cells. These plaques are bundles of 
cells, including astrocytes, surrounding a core of beta-amyloid. Beta-amyloid is 
thought to be poisonous, and cannot be broken down by the brain. These plaques are 
found in the highest density in the “temporal and occipital lobes, intermediate in the 
parietal lobes, and lowest in the frontal and limbic cortex.”9 These plaques are also a 
defining feature of Down‟s syndrome where the deposits of beta-amyloid start already 
at the age of 5-10 years.
10
  
In addition to plaques and tangles, Alzheimer‟s disease is characterised by a reduction 
of synapses, granulovacuolar degeneration, and loss of neurons. Furthermore, the loss 
of neurons in areas that are involved in the production of neurotransmitters, leads to a 
deficit of neurotransmitters, for example acetylocholine, norepinephrine and 
serotonin.
11
 This deficit can slow down or cut off communication in some areas of the 
brain. As we can see Alzheimer‟s disease is pathologically complex, yet based on 
neurological, and psychological studies we can connect some of this organic 
degeneration with specific functional deficits. As Cummings puts it: 
The distribution of plaques, tangles, and cell loss in the neocortex suggests 
that instrumental deficits such as aphasia and visual spatial abnormalities are 
attributable primarily to plaque formation and related cellular abnormalities. 
Neurofibrillary tangles contribute to the memory disturbance and the 
neuropsychiatric symptoms of the illness, while transmitter deficits – 
particularly the deficiency of acetylcholine – play a role in both cognitive and 
behavioural changes.
12
  
In short, given the specific neurological degeneration involved, we can see that the 
first cognitive symptom of Alzheimer‟s, memory loss, is clearly a result of a neuron 
loss in the hippocampus region of the brain. The other symptoms are the result of a 
complex holistic history of plaques, tangles and transmitter deficits, which spread 
throughout the brain and add to the complex cognitive, behavioural and motor 
symptoms listed above.  
                                                        
9
 Jeffrey L. Cummings, The neuropshychiatry of dementia disorders, (London: Taylor and Francis, 
2003), 64. 
10
 Engedal and Haugen, Lærebok: Demens Fakta og utfordringer, 65. 
11
 Cummings, The neuropshychiatry of dementia disorders, 66. 
12
 Ibid, 66. 
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While the symptoms presented by Alzheimer‟s are complex and interconnected, a 
brief survey of a typical progression of the disease may be helpful. Apart from long 
term memory loss, another often encountered early symptom of Alzheimer‟s is 
limited aphasia. Simply put, it often becomes difficult to find the correct word for 
something. Furthermore, completing a complex task can become difficult, as can 
finding one‟s way in new surroundings. Sometimes emotional changes are also the 
first symptoms, for example becoming tired, getting depressed, or losing interest in 
one‟s family. The large variation in symptoms shows the difficulty of reaching an 
early Alzheimer‟s diagnosis.   
As the disease progresses the memory loss will become more severe, mostly affecting 
events that have occurred in the previous days, months and years, while intact 
childhood memories can still persist. This is what is called Ribot´s law: “more recent 
information is lost before more remote events.”13 Some will have difficulty 
recognising friends and family. Aphasia will also often become a problem, especially 
problems understanding and constructing coherent sentences. Serious behavioural 
changes can also become apparent, including aggression, suspiciousness and 
hallucinations.
14
 In the last phase of the disease memory will often be constricted to 
10-15 seconds, though some still remember certain memories from their earlier 
lives.
15
 However, due to a large degree of aphasia and incoherence it is often difficult 
to distinguish the exact nature of the cognitive deficits and behavioural changes. 
Alzheimer´s also shortens the projected lifespan of a person, and is the third largest 
risk factor for death after cancer and heart conditions.
16
  
Now we need to remember that Alzheimer‟s is only one of many dementia diseases, 
even though it is the most common. We will now move on to consider four other 
types of dementia: dementia with Lewy bodies, dementia with Parkinson‟s disease, 
vascular dementia, and fronto-temporal lobar degeneration.  
Firstly, dementia with Lewy bodies is a type of dementia closely related to 
Alzheimer‟s disease (above) and Parkinson‟s disease (below). Some even argue that 
there is no distinct break between these dementia conditions but more of a 
                                                        
13
 Passer et al., Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behaviour, 512. 
14
 Engedal and Haugen, Lærebok: Demens Fakta og utfordringer, 89. 
15
 Ibid, 89. 
16
 Ibid, 90. 
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continuum.
17
 Indeed, it has no specific place in ICD10.  So, while one might argue 
that it is not a natural kind, it is distinguished in the literature.  However, the 
pathologically distinguishing feature for dementia with Lewy bodies is the presence 
of Lewy bodies in the cerebral cortex.
18
 These bodies are spherical and typically 
include the protein alpha-synuclein neurofiliments.
19
 They typically occur in the 
brainstem, and in the cortex close to the hippocampus. Symptomatically, dementia 
with Lewy bodies is distinguished by “prominent attentional deficits, fluctuating 
cognition, marked visual hallucinations, and [or] Parkinsonism.”20 Other symptoms 
can include delusions, depression, mis-identification, and sleep disorder.
21
 Dementia 
with Lewy bodies has a quite similar progression to Alzheimer‟s disease, though 
memory is often not one of the first symptoms. Attentional deficits and fluctuating 
cognition can give the impression of someone drifting in and out of (self)-
consciousness.
22
     
The second type of dementia we will briefly mention is dementia with Parkinson‟s 
disease (hereafter PD). We must first distinguish PD from Parkinsonism, which show 
similar symptoms but from a different cause, for example a brain tumour, trauma or 
drugs. The most common symptoms of PD are slow movements, involuntary tremors, 
rigidity, and postural reflex impairment, i.e. balance difficulties.
23
 These symptoms 
are due to the loss of neurons in the substantia nigra nucleus in the brain, which leads 
to a deficit of the neurotransmitter dopamine used to convey motor movement. 
Between 18 and 40 % of people with PD develop dementia.
24
 And while there are 
many similar symptoms to Alzheimer‟s disease, there are also symptomatic 
differences: 
Studies contrasting patients with Alzheimer‟s disease and PD with dementia 
demonstrate that even when matched for dementia severity there are identifiable 
clinical differences. Patients with Alzehimer‟s disease have more impaired verbal 
memory and logical memory, more impaired language with aphasic type 
                                                        
17
 Ibid, 115. 
18
 Cummings, The neuropshychiatry of dementia disorders, 117. 
19
 Ibid, 124. 
20
 Ibid, 117. 
21
 Ibid, 117. 
22
 Engedal and Haugen, Lærebok: Demens Fakta og utfordringer, 115. 
23
 Cummings, The neuropshychiatry of dementia disorders, 134. 
24
 Ibid, 136. 
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abnormalities, less severe executive dysfunction and less marked cognitive slowing 
as measured by complex reaction times.
25
 
Our third type of dementia, vascular dementia, refers to dementia caused by vascular 
lesions in the brain, such as a brain haemorrhage, which constricts blood flow to an 
area of the brain. Vascular dementia is often differentiated according to where the 
lesions occur, with symptoms corresponding to loss of use of specific areas of the 
brain. For example: “With local injury to the left hemisphere, aphasias, apraxias, and 
related syndromes such as alexia [inability to understand writing], agraphia [problems 
writing], and acalculia [difficulty with simple maths] are most frequently observed.” 
26
VaD can also be differentiated according to whether or not there are multiple 
infarctions. When there is one infarction dementia can occur if there is much damage 
in the thalamus or hippocampus, or the surrounding areas. With multiple infarctions a 
stepwise progression is often found. In short, VaD is an umbrella term which is used 
for different diseases and can cover many different symptomatic progressions, and is 
further complicated by at times co-occurring with AD. However, it is often 
distinguished by a more sudden, sometimes stepwise, progression, as opposed to the 
more gradual progression of Alzheimer‟s. 
The last dementia condition we will mention is Fronto-temporal lobar degeneration 
(henceforth FTLD). This type of dementia has an earlier onset, typically in the early 
fifties, and covers several diseases, which lead to degeneration in the frontal and 
temporal lobes of the brain.
27
 There are several causes for this type of dementia, 
including a mutation of chromosone 17, which often leads to mutations of the tau 
protein in the brain. Common symptoms of FTLD are executive dysfunction, apathy, 
withdrawal, motoric aphasia, behavioural disinhibition, and impulsivity.
28
 These 
symptoms can be present before memory loss, as it takes the disease a while to affect 
the hippocampus. However, as with the other conditions there are many variations, 
and FTLD can also overlap with other dementia conditions.         
So, as we have seen, dementia as a disease is much more complicated than initially 
characterised. The varying conditions can co-occur, and the symptomology is 
                                                        
25
 Ibid, 142. 
26
 Ibid, 142. 
27
 Ibid, 217. 
28
 Ibid, 217. 
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complex. Furthermore, this is complicated by the fact that some symptoms, such as 
forgetfulness, and behavioural symptoms, can also be present due to normal ageing, 
and environmental factors. So, dementia can affect a person in many different ways, 
but what connection do these varying cognitive symptoms have with us as a person, 
as a self? In order to answer this question we have to clarify just what it is we mean 
by a „self‟. This is the task of the next three chapters, in which we consider various 
philosophical approaches to the notion of selfhood. 
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 3: The self and dementia: the identity and no-self views 
“I start thinking about something intently and then my thoughts wander 
through fields of memory and I bob to the surface suddenly wonder for a 
moment who I am, and whether I have truly lost my mind.”29 
3.1 The self introduced  
In the previous chapter we came to an initial characterisation of Dementia. We 
considered symptoms, progression, neurological features, and the different types of 
dementia. Indeed, we came to what might be, arguably, characterised as an objective 
description of Dementia. However, our discussion said nothing of what it is like to 
have dementia, or how dementia affects a person as a person. In other words, we 
examined the scientifically observable, and inferred, particularities of dementia, but 
did not consider it as a whole; as a particular condition for human beings. One such 
human being was Thomas DeBaggio, who was diagnosed with Alzheimer‟s in 1999. 
In Losing My Mind,  a quotation from which prefaces this chapter, he describes the 
progression of the disease, its impact on his life and family, and its impact on his 
perception of the world around him. De Baggio felt that he was losing himself. To 
lose a self clearly presupposes an understanding of what it means to be a person. For 
if we do not know the essential features of human experience, how can we know how 
they would be altered by an illness such as dementia? We will therefore turn to an 
examination of different theories of the self, and to some expressions of these views 
of self in the literature of the philosophy of dementia.  
But first, why are theories of the self particularly pressing when it comes to theorising 
about dementia? Well, in the medical and philosophical literature covering dementia, 
and in clinical practice, one often comes across expressions such as “behavioural 
changes”, “personality changes”, “becoming a different person”, “loss of self”, and 
“loss of identity”. These expressions can in varying instances apply to how a person 
with dementia sees him- or herself, and also to how family, friends and caregivers see 
the person suffering from dementia. As we have seen above the various forms of 
dementia can change both a person‟s ability to remember their loved ones, and also 
change their behaviour to the point that family might express exasperation at the 
“person not being the person they were”. Indeed, if you cannot remember your loved 
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ones, your habits are changed, and/or your moods change considerably, to what extent 
can you be identified as the same person?  
There are many different theories of what it means to be a person, or a self. Do we 
essentially consist of a thinking essence, a transcendental subject, a self-narrated 
structure, or (merely) a stream of experiences? Is there a core self, some definable 
characteristic(s) which allow for any experience? Or are our selves continually 
evolving structures, in which no core can be found? Are our selves merely a reflection 
of the cognitive capacities of the brain, or must we study ourselves in relation to 
language, culture and community? But, most importantly for the present topic: if we 
do not know what a self consists in, then how can we characterise how it is altered?  
Many different philosophers have proposed many different answers to these 
questions. Indeed, recently some philosophers have tried to map out how many 
distinct views of the self there are in the literature; Neisser arriving at five, and 
Strawson at twenty-one distinct theories of the self.
30
 For reasons of overall structure, 
and the representation of views of the self and dementia in the literature, our 
investigation will revolve around four different types of theories of the self, which 
will be examined in turn: an identity view, a no-self view, both discussed in Chapter 
3, a phenomenological and narrative view, discussed in Chapter 4 and a 
hermeneutical view, introduced in Chapter 5. In making these distinctions I am 
following Zahavi, who in ”Subjectivity and Selfhood” distinguishes between and 
discusses three different types of perspectives on the self: ”A Kantian Perspective: 
The Self as a Pure Identity-Pole”,  ”A Hermeneutical Perspective: The Self as a 
Narrative Construction” and ”A Phenomenological Perspective: The Self as an 
Experiential Dimension”.31 However, I have broadened the identity conception to 
include Descartes and Locke. And I have added another purely negational view of the 
self; the no-self conception; both because it allows for a fruitful discussion of the self 
in general and because it is represented in the philosophy of dementia.  
Now, before we begin our examination of the varying conceptualisations of the self, 
we should perhaps pause to consider what we mean by self in general. While this will 
of course rely on our individual theory of the self, an intuitive glance at what is 
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involved will help our discussion. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines the 
self as: ”The elusive ”I” that shows an alarming tendency to disappear when we try to 
introspect it.”32 As the definition makes clear, the individuation of the self is a 
remarkably tricky task, which is perhaps reflected in the amount of uncertainty in the 
conclusions of the articles we will examine in this chapter. However, whatever model 
of the self we espouse there is individuation involved. Whether this individuation is 
elusive or strictly determinable, there is something separating a ”me” from the other. 
The self might be initially characterised as the minimal structure, underlying 
conditions, or principle of individuation, allowing us to be characterised as a person, 
one being. Furthermore, while some say the self underlies experience, and others that 
the self is inferred from it, the self is clearly connected to our experience as such. In 
short, theories of the self pertain to the individuation of experience, in some way 
characterising the vantage point through which we live.  
3.2 The self as self-identity 
The first category of theories of the self we will examine, is the self seen as self-
identity. This is a generalisation for conceptions of the self where there is a distinct 
subject differentiated from the world, with clear boundaries. For Descartes this 
differentiation is made on the basis of distinct substances, for Locke it is based on the 
application of our consciousness, and for Kant it is based on the transcendental 
conditions which allow for experience.   
The story of the self is often said to have begun with Descartes who stated that: ”But 
what then am I? A things that thinks? A things that doubts, understands, affirms, 
denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses.”33 We see here the 
monumental importance Descartes lays on subjectivity. Indeed, in many ways he 
defined the modern notion of subjectivity. The first-person perspective along with 
introspection are of paramount importance to Descartes; the only things we can know 
regardless of our experience in the world. 
Now, Descartes distinguishes a thinking essence from the body, which is not seen as 
essential to the self. In short, our self is based on our soul, a different substance, 
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which persists through time. This is contrary to any theory of the embodiment of the 
mind, any theory situating the mind in the brain. Though we must note that Descartes 
places the interaction of the substances in the brain; more precisely in the pineal 
gland.  
Without going into great detail it is worth noting some of the problems with 
Descartes‟ view of the self. When it comes to Descartes there is much dispute over his 
distinction between the body and soul as two distinct substances. This problem of 
interaction has been discussed at great length throughout the literature, and suffice it 
to say that the problem rests on how something without any physical dimension can 
affect the material. Furthermore, as we saw in the second chapter this theory does not, 
without modifications, allow for the recent discoveries in neuroscience, whereby 
specific functions of our minds are located in specific areas in our brain.  
Partly in response to these challenges Locke argued that while self-identity is based 
on consciousness it does not depend on a separate substance: ”That with which the 
consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, 
and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all 
the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no 
further.”34 Furthermore, Locke argues that what allows self-identity to persist through 
time is the capacity to attribute actions to itself in the past: in other words memory, a 
particular part of our self-consciousness. This allows us to bind together events in 
time, and become conscious of ourselves as something distinct. ”This personality 
extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, by 
which it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes itself past actions, 
just upon the same ground and for the same reason it does the present.”35  
Now, Locke´s reliance on self-consciousness and memory has had a great influence 
on modern theories. However, it also faces some complications. We must consider the 
reliance on memory which might be faulty. But we have to distinguish between actual 
and apparent memories. As Solomon puts it: ”to do this we would have to say that the 
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memories are in fact the correct memories of that person.”36 But then we must explain 
self-identity by way of memory, and the validity of memory by appealing to self-
identity through time. One answer to this challenge would do away with the 
coherence of the self, as does Hume, or broaden the composition of this self from 
consciousness to include community and language as in the hermeneutic view. So, 
while this argument might meet many objections, we will press on and briefly 
examine Kant´s conception of the self, before examining the applications of this 
tradition of a definitional conception of the self.  
For many it would seem strange to include Kant´s conception of the self within the 
tradition of as diverse figures as Descartes and Locke. Indeed, he is often seen as 
revolutionising the western philosophical tradition with his synthetic a priori and his 
fusion of empiricism (Hobbes/Locke/Hume) and rationalism 
(Descartes/Leibniz/Spinoza). For whereas Descartes thought our self based on a 
thinking essence separated from the material world; and Locke placed our self 
constituted in the material world through our consciousness; Kant makes the 
transcendental self the condition of any experience whatsoever, more dramatically 
formulated as the condition of the world. However, Kant shares with Descartes and 
Locke a defined, structural conception of the self, based on the disclosed first person 
perspective.  
So, what does Kant mean by this transcendental self? Firstly, for Kant we must 
distinguish between what is our empirical ego and our transcendent ego, the former 
being our looks, thoughts and memories, while the latter is the form of any possible 
experience. This structure can be inferred from the way in which we experience the 
world, as the necessary conditions of our experience. As Zahavi puts it: ”Instead of 
being something than can itself be given as an object of experience, it is a necessary 
condition of the possibility for (coherent) experience. We can infer that it must exist, 
but it is not itself something that can be experienced.”37  
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3.3 The self-identity conception of the self and dementia 
With respect to “identity theories” of dementia, one question frequently asked is 
under which conditions does it make sense to speak about a “loss if self”, or a “loss of 
personal identity”. We will now examine two distinct expressions of this view, 
drawing on what kind of theories of selfhood and personal identity that underlie them. 
Indeed, as we will see below these texts are centred on what kind of self allows for 
what they see as the pinnacle distinction in distinguishing us as selves.  
Firstly, we will start be examining Lowe‟s argument in “Can the self disintegrate? 
Personal identity, psychopathology, and disunities of consciousness.”38 Here he 
examines whether or not the philosophical doctrine of “unity of consciousness” is 
compatible with the changes occurring in dementia. Lowe formulates the doctrine as 
“taken as implying that the conscious thoughts and feelings of the same person must 
be recognisable by that person as being uniquely their own thoughts and feelings and, 
as such, unmistakable for the thoughts or feelings of someone else.”39 In short, this 
doctrine tries to accommodate for our intuition that we are “strongly unified 
beings.”40  
In discussing this doctrine Lowe draws on especially Hume, Locke and Kant´s 
theories of selfhood. As we remember for Locke coherence is important: “thinking 
intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the 
same thinking thing in different times and places.”41 Hume‟s conception on the other 
hand describes a mind, which is seen based on the idea of a bundle of perceptions 
linked together by our natural urge towards unity. And as we have seen, for Kant the 
self is the transcendental condition for experiences, and all experiences must be 
accompanied by an “I” which experiences. In Kant‟s own words “It must be possible 
for the “I think” to accompany all my representations.”42 In the face of these theories 
of selfhood, Lowe considers cases of dementia, and particular the instances of split 
awareness, whereby one is aware of a feeling or pain, without necessarily being aware 
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of oneself as the subject experiencing it, or as Lowe puts it “lack of co-consciousness 
between conscious states of the same person.”43  
Of the different characterisations of selfhood Lowe considers Locke‟s and Kant‟s to 
be closest to the mark. He regards Hume‟s conception as too narrow. While not 
negating the possibility of moments of “split awareness” it is arguably too narrow in 
not including any kind of self-consciousness. Lowe sees it is as more apt for “non-
self-reflecting animals and very young infants.”44 As for Locke‟s theory, the 
aforementioned “split awareness” might pose a problem, as it seems he has in mind a 
strong “unity-of-consciousness,” whereby the self recognises itself over time. Lastly 
Kant‟s transcendental theory would seem to allow for split awareness. However as 
Lowe puts it “unity of consciousness in this […] sense plausibly cannot serve to 
explain, because it already seems to presuppose, the unity of the self.”45 As these 
points make clear Lowe does not arrive at a definite solution. Indeed he prefers to 
“remain agnostic and admit with all due humility that although I am as sure as I am of 
anything that I exist and am a strongly unified entity, I have no real grasp of what it is 
that I am. […] Perhaps, in the end, this is what we really have to learn from so-called 
pathological cases.”46  
In “Keeping track, autobiography and the conditions for self-erosion” Michael 
Luntley addresses similar questions to Lowe. He examines Kant‟s and Locke‟s 
conception of a self, and attempts to find the conditions under which such a sense of 
self can erode. According to Luntley the “the basic cognitive capacities at issue 
concern the capacity for integrating ideas into an autobiographical unity, a unity that 
underpins our capacity to self-narrate.”47 Furthermore, the simplest example of such a 
capacity is “temporal binding,” in short, retaining an idea through time.48 When one 
loses this ability to keep track of things, Luntley argues, this “amounts to a loss of 
self-consciousness and thereby, a loss of self-reference.”49 The question at hand is 
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what model of a self allows for this capacity, the inferential unity of ideas in time, and 
whether or not this self can be said to be lost in dementia.  
Following the discussion of temporal binding, Luntley questions how Locke and Kant 
accommodate for this faculty. According to Luntley Locke argues for a self in which 
a consciousness has access to ideas over time, through retention in memory.
50
 So to 
be the same self is to have access to the same ideas at different points in time. This 
Luntley argues, “permits […] degrees of retention and personal identity thus becomes 
a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing affair.”51 Furthermore, this allows for the 
possibility to individuate ideas independently of their owner. And consequently 
Luntley argues that “[…] it is well known that many Ideas can only be individuated 
with respect to the subject, for example, demonstrative ideas.[…] Such ideas do not 
survive independently of the subjects point of view. Such an individuation of ideas is 
not then available to the Lockean.”52     
As opposed to this Lockean conception of the self, Luntley offers his interpretation of 
Kant. According to this model it is the self that individuates the ideas: indeed “[f]or 
the Kantian, a condition on the unity of inference is the possibility of the relevant 
ideas being accompanied by the “I think”.”53 So the self is that through which ideas 
are differentiated, allowing for the self persisting over time as the capacity to self-
narrate. This Luntley sees as preferable to the Lockean model, where the ideas are 
seen as independent from the self in question. In short, Luntley argues for a 
conception of the self that has as it most important characteristic the capacity to keep 
track of things through an inferential unity. But what are the implications of this 
theory when it comes to dementia?  
If keeping track of things is the basic capacity of the self, then when one loses track of 
things the self could be eroded. Luntley gives the example of a patient who cannot 
keep track of: (1) I was thirsty, (2) I have had a drink, through to: (3) I am not thirsty 
now.
54
 It is important to note that Luntley stresses that this is a theoretical model, not 
an example where empirical verification, or relevance is an issue. However, what is at 
issue is profound forgetfulness: 
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[it] is a forgetfulness that amounts to a failure to bind Ideas over time. […] The 
acquaintance relation manifests the way Ideas of objects are bound over time by a 
self, not because the acquaintance relation presupposes a primitive prior reference to 
the self, but because the self is that which is made manifest by the existence of 
temporally extended acquaintance relations.
55
 
So, according to Luntley, in a case where profound forgetfulness is apparent the self 
can be eroded. Luntley concludes that “[for] such a patient there is no judgement 
taking place, because there is no self as judge – the self that tracks, attends to, and 
makes acquaintance with things.”56 However, Luntley insists that his theory is only 
theoretical, and whether it actually fits empirically is another matter.
57
  
Here Luntley comes to a stronger conclusion than Lowe. It is important to note how 
these arguments are formulated, and particularly the theories of selfhood which 
underlie them. As we saw in both instances this kind of argument argues for a 
particular conception of the self, or identity, which is then retained, lost, or fractured, 
during dementia. According to Lowe and Luntley the key features of the self are unity 
of consciousness and the capacity to self-narrate. In short, these authors postulate a 
definition for what it is to be a person, self, or self-conscious, and discuss when this 
definition is no longer in play. And perhaps the most striking aspect of these theories 
is that they often come up with a somewhat agnostic conclusion.  
3.4 The no-self view: self as a fictional construct 
The difficulties of finding a definitive, encompassing, theory of the self have led 
many to reject the conception of the self altogether. The most influential and well-
known of these denials is Hume´s: 
I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
movement. […] The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively 
make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity 
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in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity or 
identity.
58
 
So, according to Hume, the self is a fictional conception. He argues that we are 
particularly influenced by our perception of constancy in the spatio-physical realm, 
and posit this kind of constancy to the mental. However, in the physical realm all we 
need to posit identity in the case of something being very similar, though we would 
say that a tree is the same it does of course change over time. In the same way, there 
is no such thing as a self, if we by self mean constancy over time. In short, according 
to Hume there is no self to be found in self-consciousness, just a constant flux of 
experience.  
As we can clearly see such a rejection of a coherent conception of the self would 
invalidate the conclusions of both Lowe and Luntley. Indeed, based on Hume´s 
conception of human nature we necessarily change through time, there is no core self, 
or transcendental conditions that allow for a unity of the self. This unity is only 
something we have a natural propensity to construct. So, arguably instead of a 
dissolution of the self in the instance of dementia, we are merely no longer able to 
apply our natural propensity to form an identity in the same manner.  
This kind of critique of a strict self-identity is similar to the one Lesser has argued in 
”Dementia and personal identity.”59 He argues that although what we might perceive 
in dementia is a change in the self, fundamental change is part of our necessary 
human condition: ”if we were not changing beings, we would not decline, but we also 
would not develop. So we have to accept not only that being liable to decline is part 
of being a person, but also that we could only avoid being liable to decline if we were 
unchanging beings who could cease at some point to have a future.”60 Indeed, he 
argues that the idea that we could not decline is unintelligible; therefore it is a 
necessary part of being a person. And, (while this might not be much comfort to 
viewing dementia?), it is nonsensical to argue that decline is not included in being a 
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person. Therefore, it is not helpful to view a person as core structural self, as it does 
not allow for a necessary human feature.  
Now, one can argue that this argument is circular. Just because human beings do in 
fact decline, this does not mean that it is an essential part of what it means to be one. 
Indeed, this conception of the self seems parallel to the self-identity theories above, 
for instead of postulating a condition for the experience of the self, it looks for a 
conception of a person which allows for our experiences of persons as such. However, 
in a similar manner to Hume, Lesser points out that change is an essential part of 
being a person. (Though for Hume this essence is a fictional conception to begin 
with.) This can be contrasted with the Locke and Kant‟s theoretical followers Luntley 
and Lowe, who characterise the essence of the self as some kind of faculty, either our 
capacity to form an identity, or our capacity to be aware of the I which must 
necessarily accompany out thoughts.  
Indeed, the identity view often sets as its goal to postulate philosophical conditions 
for what it means to be a self, person or have an identity, and then examines when this 
may no longer be the case. Furthermore, a critique of such a view denies a situation 
whereby our self is not meaningful after fundamental change. Now, we have seen that 
both these conceptions have their limitations. The first seems to draw too strict a 
distinction between what is a self and what is not a self, and the negation of the self 
does not seem to be a helpful way of characterising our experience of ourselves as 
unitary beings. 
The validity of these conceptions will now be examined by contrasting them with the 
two subsequent theoretical frame works of the self: a hermeneutical or narrative and a 
phenomenological conception. These will be seen to necessarily allow for a “broader” 
conception of the self; which characterises a composition of the self relying on our 
interaction with the world, relationships, our language and meaning-making.  
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4: The self and dementia: A Phenomenological and narrative conception 
4.1 Broader conceptions of the self 
We will now move on to broader conceptions of the self and identity where 
relationships, language and interacting in the world are seen as important: a 
phenomenological perspective and a hermeneutic perspective. We will see how these 
varying conceptions have been used in theorising about dementia, and how they can 
accommodate a variety of symptoms and questions which arise through the empirical 
study of dementia. We will then, in the next chapter, go into greater detail about one 
particular phenomenological conception of the self: Heidegger‟s Dasein.  
The theories of the self we will be examining next are largely influenced by 
continental philosophy since Kant. In broad terms they represent a turn away from the 
logical structural unity of an internal self, separated from the world; to include 
relationships, language and the world in general. Furthermore, they also have more 
constitutive and structural features then Hume´s denial of the self.  
The story of the self told in the last chapter progressed from Descartes‟ self identity, 
through Kant‟s transcendental self and concluded with Hume´s denial of the self. 
Now we will move on to the phenomenological conception of the self, before 
describing the hermeneutical self, after which we will examine these conceptions of 
the self in relation to dementia. The hermeneutical self, often described as a narrative 
view of the self, will be descibed after the phenomenological as it builds on a specific 
part of the phenomenological: the hermeneutical theory of understanding.  
4.2 The phenomenological self 
What do we mean by a phenomenological conception of the self? The story of 
phenomenology is often said to begin with Brentano and Husserl. Both philosophers 
sought a method by which to arrive at an understanding of our consciousness by way 
of description, rather than explanation.
61
 Furthermore, Brentano sought to employ 
descriptive psychology as a foundation of philosophy, as he argued the physical world 
is only accessible through our mental acts: ”Our mental phenomena are the things 
which are most our own.”62 Therefore, we must study our mental activity: ”we will 
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have to show, in general, the nature of the objects of our psychical activities, and [the 
nature] of the differences of modes of relation in which we relate to them 
psychically.”63 This leads us to an investigation of the self, on the basis of our 
psychological acts and how they relate to each other.  
Husserl, greatly influenced by Brentano, also sought to resurrect philosophy as a 
science, and he sought apodictic truths on which to base it. In a similar manner to 
Kant, Husserl sought out (formal) structures relating to our experience. But whereas 
Kant´s theory aims at showing universal and necessary structures for any experience, 
the transcendental self, Husserl used phenomenology as a method in order to 
investigate our consciousness as such. As Solomon puts it:  
As opposed to Descartes and Kant (as well as Fichte and Hegel), Husserl‟s 
phenomenology is an appeal not to deduction or dialectic but directly to ´”evidence”, 
not the evidence of the senses but of the consciousness as such, ”apodeictic” evidence 
that can be directly intuited, with a specially trained method of philosophical 
investigation.
64
 
Husserl´s study of our consciousness led him to suspend what is often intuitively 
taken to be real and not-real, in his words ””parathesize” the making of a 
judgement.”65 Through this suspension of judgement Husserl arrives at the distinction 
between the noetic and the noematic structures of our consciousness. Simply put, the 
former signifies the mental processes involved, and the latter the content of these 
processes.  The specifications of how these structures interact is the subject matter of 
phenomenology. Furthermore, this gives us an insight into what kind of perspective 
on the self we arrive at:  
The Ego […] ”lives” in such acts. Its living in them signifies, not the being of some 
”contents” or other in a stream of contents, but rather a multiplicity of describable 
manner in which the pure Ego, as the ”free being” which it is, lives in certain 
intentive mental processes, those which have the universal modus cogito.
66
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So moving from the particular to the general, we can see that a phenomenological 
conception of the self involves a study of our conscious life as such. Indeed, as 
opposed to the identity conception we examined above, we are here suspending our 
common distinction between the subjective and objective, rather than using this 
distinction as our basis for our conception of the self. As we shall see, this conception 
of the self allows us to study alterations of the consciousness, such as dementia, 
without first presupposing a structure of the consciousness which does not necessarily 
allow for these alterations.  
Now, while there have been many different developments of a phenomenological 
conception of the self we can now arrive at an initial characterisation which will guide 
us in our later discussion of the hermeneutic self, and more importantly Heidegger‟s 
conception of the self. This phenomenological method seeks a description of our 
conscious life, and conscious acts without presupposing an objective model to 
contrast it with. As Zahavi puts it a phenomenological perspective of the self can be 
characterised as follows: 
The self is claimed to possess experiential reality, is taken to be closely linked to the 
first-person perspective, and is, in fact, identified with the very first-personal 
givenness of the experiential phenomena. […] In short, the self is conceived neither 
as an ineffable transcendental precondition, nor as a mere social construct that 
evolves through time; it is taken to be an integral part of our conscious life with an 
immediate experiential reality.
67
 
4.3 The narrative self 
The narrative conception of the self, while long in the making, is a rather more recent 
conception of the self, formulated on the basis of the philosophy of Ricoeur and 
MacIntyre. A narrative conception of the self, sees the self as intrinsically constituted 
by how we structure a story of our lives. Simply put, the question of the self becomes 
the question of how we constitute the stories of our lives. This is because, as Zahavi 
puts it ”our actions gain intelligibility by having a place in a narrative sequence.”68 
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And as such, a proponent of a narrative theory of the self would argue that if one 
disregards the narrative then any proposed theory of the self must fail. 
69
 
The theory of the narrative self has amongst its influences the hermeneutic theory of 
understanding, as developed by Heidegger and Gadamer. As we shall see below, 
Heidegger believed that understanding always involves a pre-understanding of what is 
involved; we have to presuppose something in order to understand. 
70
 Building on this 
Gadamer believed that our prejudices, rather than our judgements, are needed for 
understanding: ”Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply 
conditions whereby we experience something.”71 Notice the very distinct break with 
Kant. Our understanding is not rooted in judgement, but on prejudice; and a necessary 
prejudice at that.  
So, from the theory that any understanding involves an interpretation, we can move to 
the proposition that any understanding of the self involves an interpretation of the 
self. For a narrative theorist the self must include an interpretation of who we are, and 
this story is structured in the form of a narrative of what we have done, and our future 
aspirations. Furthermore, this story is not constructed in isolation, but involves other 
narratives and language, with which we construct the narrative. The varying emphasis 
on constitutive factors, varies from theorist to theorist, but the underlying argument is 
the same; the self as structural narrative.   
4.4 The narrative self and dementia  
Now we will discuss the narrative conception of the self in relation to the philosophy 
of dementia. We start with Radden and Fordyce‟s discussion of identity in “Into 
darkness: losing identity with dementia”72. Following Ricoeur the authors use the 
distinction between ipse and idem aspects of identity to criticise a Lockean 
“traditional” view of selfhood. In order to clarify this view we will first introduce the 
ipse/idem distinction, before going on to their discussion of narratives.  
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Starting with perhaps the most conventional concept: Idem signifies “sameness 
identity”73 which signifies, a hierarchy of significations, of which permanence in time 
constitutes highest order.
74
 Ipse identity is on the other hand concerned with what is 
different; it involves “the dialectic of self and other than self.”75 So selfhood is not 
just a matter of identity, but also of contrast, the self implies otherness.
76
 Radden and 
Fordyce argue that this notion of selfhood might enlighten our approach to dementia: 
“When all thought processes and memory appear to have been eroded, there might yet 
be sense to speaking of the person with dementia as remaining themselves “inasmuch 
as being another.”77 On the basis of this conceptual framework, the authors then go on 
to discuss recognition and narratives. 
According to Radden and Fordyce the construction of a narrative is key for the 
constitution of the self. However, this narrative is not arrived at selectively by the self, 
but rather emerges from the interaction of a person within a community. Indeed, they 
argue:  
These identities are constituted, it is widely agreed, by a complex interaction between 
first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. […] The very self-awareness required 
to possess an identity depends upon and grows out of the contribution, and 
particularly the recognition, of other persons, as well as deriving from otherness as 
such.
78
 
So the self is here seen as constituted by a self-narrating structure, interacting with 
other narratives, in a community. Furthermore, this narrative is also complemented by 
the interaction with “otherness as such,” something not theoretically assimilated, but 
which connects us through our recognition of something different. Indeed, following 
recent theoretical developments in political philosophy especially, the authors draw 
on the notion derived from Hegel of the need to be recognised, both by communities 
and by individuals. Recognition is here not merely seen as a moral question, but also a 
psychological inclination whereby the self recognises the other. In this regard it could 
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even be said to be self-constituting. So what are the implications of these reflections 
for the philosophy of dementia? 
Fordyce and Radden argue that their Ricoeurian influenced model of the self can 
accommodate for our intuition that aspects of the self are still around even after one 
has suffered from much memory loss and personality changes. Firstly, the notion of a 
narrative version of the self allows for one perpetually constructed self, whereby 
alteration is not necessarily a loss of self. Secondly, this self-narrative is also 
influenced by others‟ recognition of its otherness, whereby others can act on the 
continual construction of the self. As the authors argue “[…] breaking the Lockean 
concepts and instead acknowledging the self “as another” in Ricoeur´s words, has 
revealed ways to salvage for a little longer a little more, not only the sameness of the 
dementia sufferer but also, perhaps, aspects of their ipseity or selfhood.”79 However, it 
should be noted that also their conclusion is far from bombastic, showing the need for 
a more developed view of the idem/ipseity construction of the self, and the narrative 
development.  
Now we will examine Aquilina and Hughes‟ discussion of the self in “The return of 
the living dead: agency lost and Found?” In this article they describe some of the 
caregivers and family responses to severely demented patients. First they discuss 
studies of caregivers who have been found not to interact on a personal level with 
severe dementia. Indeed, a study by Tappen et al. found that “nursing staff frequently 
avoid all but task-oriented communication with people in the latest stages of the 
disease on the assumption that the severely demented experience life as 
meaningless.”80 However, family and caregivers have also reported patients as still 
having a strong awareness of themselves and their surroundings, especially in what is 
described as lucid episodes. In short, the complex and diverse clinical phenomena one 
comes across with demented people suggest we need a complex view of self which 
can accommodate these diverse intuitive perceptions of selfhood in demented 
patients.  
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For simplicity‟s sake Aquillana and Hughes propose two broad models for 
understanding the self, with an “inner” self and an “outer” self: 
(1) the private subjective experience of being self-aware, which is seemingly 
dependent on biological structures; 
(2) the public observable aspects of self, which depend on psycho-social structures 
including social relations, culture, and language.
81
  
These models supposedly show an intuitive view many have of demented patients. 
However, while these two models of the self are supposed to bring out different views 
of seeing the self in relation to dementia, the authors go on to argue that there can be 
no strict dichotomy between the two. Furthermore, the interconnected complex nature 
of the self is argued to be a reason to suppose that the failure of one single capacity 
such as “agency” is not enough to lose a self.  
Aqallana and Hughes see the first view of self as emerging from a Descartian and 
Lockean tradition that places a strict dichotomy between agent and world. The 
problem with strictly following this view is that one might dehumanise a demented 
person, in the case where the “inner” self is no longer accessible, where agency seems 
lost. However, as Aqallana and Hughes argue, the “inner” self, which contain a 
person‟s memory and personality, cannot be separated from the interpersonal 
environment. Furthermore, “the outer self is manifested through interactions with the 
external world. It is therefore manifest both by the people who relate to the person 
with dementia, as well as by the changes in behaviour and language of the person 
with dementia.”82 So both selves are seen as mutually dependent and inseparable: 
“Our inner states are manifest by outer behaviour. Our shared understanding of outer 
characteristics is a prerequisite of meaningful language. Outer behaviour, that is, 
requires shared (inner) understanding.”83 
The interaction between “inner” and “outer” selves brings the authors to briefly 
consider the embodied view of a self. The embodied view is used to further criticise 
the view of an “inner” self, showing instead that the self is always situated. This line 
of thinking draws on aspects of Merleau-Ponty‟s thinking which we will consider in 
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more detail below. The important thing to notice here is the questioning of the 
different view of self. Finally, Aqallana and Hughes go on to consider when a 
demented person can be said to lose agency. They come to the conclusion that this 
can never be separated from a specific context, theoretically described and stripped of 
human significance: “The intentional nature of an action is, on this view, given by its 
embedding context. So even in severe dementia the patient can still be regarded as a 
person.”84 
Now, in the same way we saw similar structures of argumentation for the varying 
identity theorists, we can here see some similar theoretical developments between 
Aquallana and Hughes, and Fordyce and Radden. Indeed, both articles state the need 
for an expanded view of the self. Furthermore, they agree as to the need to take into 
account continental developments in philosophy, and to externalise to varying degrees 
both the self, and the contributing factors to shaping a self, especially noting the 
interacting elements.  
4.5 A narrative and phenomenological fusion 
Finally, before we go on in the next chapter, to our investigation of Heidegger‟s 
conception of the self, we will turn to  Widdershoven and Berghmans, who draw on 
both the narrative and the phenomenological conception of the self in their discussion 
of dementia. In “meaning-making in dementia: a hermenutic perspective”85 they draw 
our attention to hermeneutic and phenomenological tools in order to understand some 
of the aspects we encounter in the empirical and clinical study of dementia. Rather 
than drawing on a particular view of the self, they point out certain processes involved 
in human experience, particularly a hermeneutic model of understanding and mood, in 
relation to advance directives. 
Advance directives are documents constructed by a patient and a caregiver in 
anticipation of a future situation where the patient is no longer able to decide on 
treatment. They postulate such things as what amount of life-prolonging treatment the 
patient will be given. And, although not widely used in dementia care, they offer 
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difficult questions in relation to a patient‟s understanding of future demands regarding 
decisions in their treatment.
86
  
While the particularities of mood and understanding will be discussed below, as these 
are aspects of Heidegger‟s existential characterisation of the self, a brief description 
of their argument will be helpful. In a similar manner to the hermeneutic theories of 
dementia discussed above, Widdershoven and Berghmans argue that understanding of 
a person with dementia is not a question of an underlying fundamental capacity, but 
rather connected to the environment within which the person finds themself. As such, 
certain processes of comprehension for the person with dementia might alter but there 
is no clear break between comprehension and the loss of it:  
Processes of meaning-making are not the result of conscious calculations or decisions 
by the individual; they precede such activities and serve as their foundation. In 
dementia, meaning-making becomes problematic. Common ways of understanding 
often tend to break down. Perspectives, which used to be shared, may drift apart.
87
 
As such, Widdershoven and Berghmans do not draw on a comprehensive theory of 
the self, but rather on aspects of a hermenutic and phenomenological theory of 
understanding. Their conclusions, however, tie in with the phenomenological 
explication of Dasein which will follow, although they are not part of a 
comprehensive view of the self. In so far as they describe certain characteristics of the 
phenomenological interpretation of experience, they differ from the more broad view 
of a narrative structure, and the identity views. However, in order to grasp the 
theoretical implications of such characteristics of the understanding for dementia, we 
must in what follows first closely examine Heidegger´s structure of the self as being-
in-the-world, through which such theory of understanding has emerged.  
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5: Heidegger´s Dasein: An ontological examination 
5.1 Being and Time: Heidegger‟s methodology 
In this chapter we will consider Heidegger‟s theory of Dasein in Being and Time. 
First it must be noted that the primary purpose of this chapter is not to critically 
analyse Heidegger‟s conception of Dasein, but rather to render it intelligible for our 
application of it to the study of dementia. More specifically, to examine the parts of 
his theory which give us an understanding of a phenomenological conception of the 
self. By way of introducing Heidegger‟s philosophical theory, we can pause briefly to 
consider his harsh criticisms of the psychology and biology of his time. In Being and 
Time he states that: 
We must show that those investigations and formulations of the question which have 
been aimed at Dasein heretofore, have missed the real philosophical  problem 
(notwithstanding their objective fertility), and that as long as they persist in missing 
it, they have no right to claim they can accomplish that for which they are basically 
striving. In distinguishing the existential analytic from anthropology, psychology, and 
biology we shall confine ourselves to what is in principle the ontological question.
88
  
By the end of this chapter we will have arrived at an explanation for why Heidegger 
believed psychology was deficient, what he means by the ontological question and the 
existential analytic, and most importantly at an understanding of Heidegger‟s theory 
of the fundamental structures of human existence. We will mainly be dealing with the 
first part of Being and Time, as this part introduces us to the most general structures 
of Heidegger‟s conception of self, which we will be applying later. Firstly, I will 
introduce Heidegger‟s project in Being and Time, and his understanding of some of 
the most important terms used such as ontic, ontological, and existential. Then, I will 
explain the compound Being-in-the-world, in relation the world in which Dasein finds 
itself, and the existential structures for this existence.  And thirdly, we will come 
round full circle, in good Heideggerian tradition, to revisit these opening remarks, and 
anticipate some of the uses of Heidegger‟s existential analysis of Dasein for a 
philosophical, psychological, and neurological understanding of dementia.  
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Let us now turn to Heidegger‟s Being and Time. We will here focus on Heidegger‟s 
existential analysis of Dasein. However, before we begin it is important to note some 
of the semantic and conceptual difficulties one comes across while interpreting 
Heidegger. In order to understand these, the word Dasein is a good place to start. The 
reason Heidegger turns to the study of Dasein is his realisation that Dasein is the 
“being to whom the question of being comes into question.” In other words, a being 
that raises questions considering its manner of existence. Dasein, literally meaning 
being-there, has often been taken as being short hand for man, or person. However, 
we should remember that one of Heidegger‟s explicit intentions in Being and Time 
was to try to get rid of a lot of conceptual baggage, which he argues has kept us in the 
dark concerning the meaning of Being. Such concepts include subject, object, person, 
individual and consciousness. Here the novel term “Dasein” points towards some 
meaning, which is to be attained through the existential analytic of Dasein. Indeed, 
Heidegger often uses novel words and phrases, and while this sometimes makes the 
text difficult to follow, it makes it all the more important to follow it closely. 
Therefore, in the following explication of Being and Time we will stay away from 
terms such as subject, person, and individual, before we finally try to reconcile these 
distinct stories of man.   
In Being and Time Heidegger starts out with the “question of being,” but how can this 
question be asked? And what method should be used in answering it? Heidegger 
raises these problems in the introduction, where he begins by stating that the question 
of being “has today been forgotten.”89 Indeed, while we all have an intuitive grasp of 
what is involved, the importance of the question and our access to it has passed into 
oblivion. However, we must turn to Dasein as “This entity which each of us is himself 
and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being”90. So as Dasein 
raises this question, we must investigate Dasein in order to hope to grasp the question 
of Being in general. Furthermore, as with Husserl‟s investigation, Heidegger‟s is 
supposed to be pre-supposition less, as opposed to other scientific disciplines such as 
physics, and biology. These theories it is argued, build on basic concepts that are 
taken for granted. This could of course be extended to our previous encounters with 
the fields of neurology, psychology, and psychiatry. Heidegger insists his exploration 
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of Dasein is more fundamental, and in order to understand this we must first 
differentiate between his understanding of the ontical, ontological, existentiell, and 
existential.  
5.2 Distinctions: Ontical/ontological and existentiell/existential 
For Heidegger the difference between an ontical and an ontological enquiry can 
roughly be explained as the difference between enquiries into entities as entities, and 
inquiries into the Being of specific entities or Being in general. So whereas an ontical 
understanding takes the view of studying entities as entities, like ornitology, or the 
symptomology and neurological symptoms of dementia, ontological understanding 
seeks a more fundamental explanation of the Being of entities. This can be clarified 
by looking at Dasein, as Heidegger states that: “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that 
it is ontological.”91 In other words, Dasein is an entity that is constituted in such a 
way that it is capable of questioning its own manner of existence. An investigation 
into this constitution would be ontological, as it questions the meaning of being an 
entity: Dasein. So, Dasein is distinguished as an entity by being concerned about its 
existence. As Heidegger puts it: “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its 
existence – in terms of a possibility of itself, to be itself or not itself.”92 When Dasein 
questions itself, as in the literature of Sartre and Camus, in terms of its possibilities, it 
is engaging in an existentiell investigation. However, “[by] “existentiality” we 
understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist.”93 So an 
existential examination of Dasein is a study of the fundamental interconnected 
structures that make up our experience. But if the meaning of Being has been lost, 
from what standpoint can we approach the existential examination of ourselves?  
Heidegger argues that Dasein has access to the question of Being, through the 
everyday way in which we find ourselves in the world. In “Dasein‟s own ontical 
structure […] a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite 
characteristic.”94 So, an ontology of Dasein can be seen as giving explicit account of 
what we implicitly know through our everyday involvement in the world.
95
 This 
proves to be a very characteristic structural feature in Heidegger‟s argumentation, 
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moving from what is ontically known to an ontologically deeper level, after which he 
often describes how the ontical understanding is based on, and derived from, the 
ontological. As we will see this level of understanding has great importance for the 
understanding of our human selves we arrive at. We can anticipate this by saying that 
the self should not be studied merely ontically, as an entity, for this would miss out on 
Dasein meaning constituting nature. Dasein should rather be understood ontologically 
and existentially, questioning what it means for Dasein to be: explicated through the 
holistic structure of being-in-the-world. We turn next to Heidegger‟s explication of 
Dasein in its everydayness. 
In the second chapter of Being and Time Heidegger goes on to explicate Dasein‟s a 
priori structure as Being-in-the-world. This compound is meant to express the unitary 
nature of how we find ourselves in the world. While a unitary phenomenon, this 
compound can be highlighted by examining some of its constitutive elements: in-the-
world, “who is in the mode of Dasein‟s average everydayness”, and “Being in as 
such.”96  
Firstly then, what does Heidegger mean by in-the-world? While the statement that we 
find ourselves in a world might seem to state the obvious, Heidegger‟s analysis shows 
that our immersion in the world precedes an account of ourselves as entities situated 
in a totality of entities. An important distinction to comprehend in order to understand 
the world in which we find ourselves is that between objects seen as present-at-hand 
and ready-to-hand. To encounter something as present-at-hand is to grasp something 
theoretically as a thing, an entity. As opposed to this, to encounter something as 
ready-to-hand is to use something without thinking specifically of the use of it. As 
Heidegger puts it “[the] ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all[…] The 
peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it 
must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.”97 To take 
one of Heidegger‟s most cited examples: when hammering one is not aware of the 
hammer as a separate entity in the world, it is a piece of equipment and as such it 
recedes into the background. In the same way a good pilot will often remark that 
when flying one is not aware of the distinction between oneself and the plane, but 
merely the flying; being one with the plane.  
                                                        
96
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 79. 
97
 Ibid, 79. 
42 
 
Heidegger continues by arguing that anything ready-to-hand must belong to a holistic 
totality. From this it follows that “Taken strictly, there “is” no such thing as an 
equipment.”98 Any equipment is essentially part of a totality of equipment, whereby 
we aim at something to be done, some “towards-which”. Indeed, Heidegger argues 
the present-at-hand way of seeing things is not the way we are involved with things in 
our average everydayness, rather we notice something as present-at-hand when its 
usability is somehow impaired, if the hammer cannot be found, or the engine on the 
plane stalls. In other words, Heidegger argues that our ordinary interaction in the 
world is pre-theoretical. So if Dasein primarily is involved with the world as ready-to-
hand, what kind of world does Dasein primarily find itself in? 
In the third chapter of Being and Time Heidegger characterises several different ways 
in which we can conceptualise the world. Firstly, there is the sense many people 
would probably find intuitively plausible, the world ontically used to signify the 
totality of present-at-hand entities.
99
 Secondly, world can ontologically be used to 
signify the Being of the aforementioned entities. This could for example refer to the 
world of psychology, where “world” signifies the “realm of possible objects” to the 
psychologist. 
100
 Thirdly, “world” can be used in another ontical sense – not, however, 
as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-
the-world, but rather as that “wherein” a factical Dasein as such can be said to “live”. 
“World” has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification.”101 This might refer to 
one‟s domestic environment, a world where one exists primordially. Finally, “world” 
might “[designate] the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood.”102 This refers 
not specifically to any kind of world but rather the a priori environment of “world” 
wherein Dasein finds itself. From these considerations we can see how according to 
Heidegger the present-at-hand is less primordial, and derived from the ready-to-hand, 
and that the theoretically composed world of entities is less primordial, and derived 
from the world of our everyday involvement: “Being-in-the-world, according to our 
Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in 
references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of 
                                                        
98
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 97. 
99
 Ibid, 93. 
100
 Ibid, 93. 
101
 Ibid, 93. 
102
 Ibid, 93. 
43 
 
equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the 
world.”103 
This world of equipment is not just limited to tools, but also includes signs. As 
Heidegger puts it: “signs, in the first instance, are themselves items of equipment 
whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating.”104 So signs 
are also ready-to-hand, belonging to a totality, but because of its specific referencing a 
sign also “explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that 
together with it the worldly character of the ready to hand announces itself.”105 So 
the world in which everyday Dasein finds itself is a holistic referential totality, but 
what about other people?  
5,3 The Being of being-in-the-world 
Moving on then to our second part of the compound being-in-the-world we will now 
investigate “the who” of being-in-the-world. Heidegger tells us this will lead us to 
“certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: 
Being-with and Dasein-with”.106 In this exploration Heidegger in typical fashion starts 
out on the ontical level: “The question of the “who” answers itself in terms of the “I” 
itself, the “subject”, the “self”. The who is what maintains itself as something 
identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, and relates 
itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.”107 This view of Dasein corresponds 
quite well with the views of the self we encountered in the first part of chapter 3: the 
self conceptualised as an entity enduring over time. However, this characterisation of 
the self has run into many problems over the years: how can one, for example, 
definitively prove the existence of other minds if all we know is our self? Indeed, 
Heidegger argues that this is a present-at-hand, derivative, conceptualisation of the 
self. By considering oneself as a theoretical cognizable “I” one has converted Dasein 
into a thing: 
Just as the ontical obviousness of the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world 
misleads us into the conviction that the meaning of this Being is obvious 
                                                        
103
 Ibid, 107. 
104
 Ibid, 108. 
105
 Ibid, 110. 
106
 Ibid, 149. 
107
 Ibid, 150. 
44 
 
ontologically, and makes us overlook the phenomenon of the world, the ontical 
obviousness of the fact that Dasein is in each case mine, also hides the possibility that 
the ontological problematic which belongs to it has been led astray.
108
 
As opposed to this ontical view of the self, we must ask who Dasein is in its everyday 
life. How do we then encounter other people? Heidegger here argues that the way we 
mostly interact with other people is in an environmental fashion. We do not cognize 
them as separate entities, but rather interact in an already defined world of meaning. 
However, others are not simply encountered as something ready-to-hand, but they 
also in a sense constitute the world wherein Dasein finds itself. “Thus Dasein´s world 
frees entities which also – in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein 
themselves – are “in” the world in which they are at the same time encountered 
within-the-world, and are “in” it by way of Being-in-the-world.”109  
Heidegger goes on to differentiate the environmental character of “the other” as being 
Being-with and Dasein-with. Heidegger differentiates these by saying: 
If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like 
our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world (which, by way 
of anticipation, we have called “concern”) it must be interpreted in terms of the 
phenomenon care; for as “care” the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined. […] 
Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities encountered within-the-world. 
But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have 
the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves 
Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather solicitude.
110
   
So while Dasein-with is connected to “care”, Being-with is connected to “solicitude”. 
Care is the most general word Heidegger uses to characterise being-in-the-world. It 
roughly denotes the way Dasein comports itself in a caring manner always immerged 
environmentally within-the-world, both towards Dasein and other entities. Solicitude 
on the other hand is used for the way Dasein comports itself in a caring manner 
towards other Dasein. “Caring manner” should here not be understood in an ethical 
sense, but rather in the sense that Dasein concerns itself: “Being for, against, or 
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without one another, passing one another by, not “mattering” to one another – these 
are all possible ways of solicitude.”111  
In order to make this clear a brief recapitulation of Heidegger‟s well-known analysis 
of “the They” will be helpful. “The They” refers to a way in which Dasein, as being-
with, can be in the world in-authentically. In a way Dasein is in this sense what we 
would mean by the English phrase “one,” “[…] whereby every other is like the 
next.”112 In this sense one is average, passing on information uncritically, and just 
taking on the kind of being that is on offer. However, “the They” should not be seen 
as a moral category, indeed it is a way of being which belongs to Dasein‟s 
constitution: an existential characterising the average everydayness of Dasein.  
So, Dasein is primordially socially characterized by Dasein-with and Being-with, 
whereby Dasein is immerged in an environment that is matter of concern for it. 
Furthermore, this being-with can embody several forms, one of which takes on the 
form of “the They” in which one uncritically takes on a general way of being.  
5.4 The existential constitution of Dasein 
Moving on to the third part of the compound being-in-the-world we arrive at the 
“being-in as such” 113. This exploration brings together the previous two compounds 
in the holistic structure of the four existentials: state-of-mind, understanding, 
discourse and falling. We will go through these in turn before bringing them together 
in the framework of being-in-the-world.  
Firstly, and perhaps most intuitively accessible, we have “state-of-mind”. As 
Heidegger puts it: “What we indicate ontologically by the term “state-of-mind” is 
ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-
attuned.”114 This existential can also be explained as part of the compound Being-
there. In short, Dasein always has a mood; ontically we can recognize this as people 
always being, angry, sad, happy, or indifferent. Ontologically, Heidegger argues state-
of-mind is constitutive of Dasein, even when Dasein is not aware of it. Heidegger 
uses the concept “thrownness” to emphasis the way in which Dasein always finds 
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itself situated in some already given situation, and in some given mood. However, we 
should not merely understand state-of-mind in the narrow sense as always being in a 
mood, but rather as being attuned to the world in a certain way. As Heidegger puts it: 
“Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of 
which we can encounter something that matters to us.”115 So not only do we always 
find ourselves in a mood, but state-of-mind allows for our concern within-the-world. 
Secondly, as part of the primordial structure of being-there we have understanding. 
Heidegger explains understanding in relation to the three characteristics of: 
possibility, projection and interpretation.
116
 Through possibility Dasein primordially 
understands itself as what it can be. This possibly should be distinguished from 
logical possibility; rather Dasein essentially understands itself in light of its 
possibilities. “Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its 
possibility.”117 Furthermore, Dasein understands itself though projection; this is not 
limited to things like plans for the future, but Dasein rather already sees ahead, 
characterising itself pre-theoretically. “As projecting, understanding is the kind of 
Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities.”118 This projection is 
not limited to our views of self, but rather as Dasein itself constitutes the worldhood 
of the world, this projection applies to the holistic framework of being-in-the-world. 
Finally, “The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility – that of 
developing itself. This development of the understanding we call interpretation.”119 
So existentially Dasein projects possibilities, which can undergo a process of 
interpretation, whereby what is projected is altered. In other words, we always 
understand something as something, where this as is arrived at through the pre-
theoretical interaction and application of possibility, projection and interpretation, 
which constitute understanding for Dasein. (“Every interpretation has its fore-having, 
fore-sight, and its fore-conception.”120)   
Thirdly, we turn to the existential category of discourse. Here we find Heidegger‟s 
discussion of language, which he believed had been hitherto immerged in an ontical, 
present-at-hand, way of seeing it. According to Heidegger: “The fact that language 
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now becomes our theme for the first time will indicate that this phenomenon has its 
roots in the existential constitution of Dasein‟s disclosedness. The existential-
ontologial foundation of language is discourse or talk.”121 Discourse is primordial on 
the same level as state-of-mind and understanding, and it is from discourse we get 
meaning. “Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility.”122 The framework within 
which discourse gets used is language. However, as with Heidegger´s 
conceptualisation of “world”, we must not primarily see language as a collection of 
present-at-hand entities, but rather as something Dasein is environmentally concerned 
with, and immerged within. When everyday Dasein communicates, this discourse is 
not characterised as the transferring of information from one subject to another, 
“Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-
understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes “explicitly” shared; that is to say, it 
is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and 
appropriated.”123 So discourse according to Heidegger, is an environmental pre-
theoretical encountering of ready-to-hand meaning within-the-world, connected to the 
existentials of state-of-mind and understanding, and, indeed, the worldhood of the 
world itself.   
This brings us to the fourth existential falling, which while perhaps the trickiest 
existential to comprehend, can be got at through the concept of “idle talk”. Idle talk is 
a way in which everyday Dasein often communicates, whereby one is not consciously 
questioning what is said. “Idle talk does not have the kind of Being which belongs to 
consciously passing off something as something else.”124 Heidegger argues this kind 
of discourse gives the impression of understanding, while actually “closing off”. In 
other words, it acts as the bringing on of something “proximinally” understood, 
without ontologically uncovering at all; the meaningless passing off in discourse 
something which is not in a meaningful way appropriated. Idle talk is connected to 
our previous discussion of “the They” in that in it “The “they” prescribes one´s state-
of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees”.”125 Falling constitutes Dasein in 
that it is a possibility for Dasein not to be concerned with determining its own state-
of-mind: 
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The phenomenon of falling does not give us something like a “night view” of Dasein, 
a property which occurs ontically and may serve to round out the innocuous aspects 
of Dasein itself. Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far 
from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes Dasein‟s days n their 
everydayness.
126
 
As an existential, falling refers to a way in which Dasein is casually going along with 
things pre-theoretically. However, this is not taken to be a negative aspect of Dasein, 
merely a way in which Dasein is. So, these four existentials; state-of-mind, 
understanding, discourse and falling, are all to be understood as ontologically 
constituted in a pre-theoretical manner. They are argued to characterise the 
experiential framework within which we find ourselves in the world. 
5.5 Dasein as a phenomenological conception of the self 
We must now raise the questions of what differentiates this understanding of the self 
from the previous theories, and why Heidegger argues that it is more fundamental 
than a “mere” psychological characterisation of man: “We must always bear in mind, 
however, that these ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent 
hypotheses derived from empirical material, but that they are always “there” already, 
even when that empirical material simply gets collected.”127 
As we have seen Heidegger argues that the existential constitution of Dasein is given 
independently of empirical “facts”. By using an ontological investigation Heidegger 
attempts to ascertain the pre-theoretical structures of our being. A psychological 
investigation on the other hand, examines man as an entity; one of many. Indeed, with 
such a view one must presuppose the veracity of the subject/object distinction, as a 
basis for empirical investigation. In short, there need to be “hard facts” for them to be 
studied. Therefore, an ontical and psychological theory presupposes an understanding 
of the world as primarily a realm of independent entities.  
However, if one accepts the phenomenological constitution of the self, a 
psychological and ontical investigation must be based on the pre-theoretical structure 
within which we find ourselves in the world. Primarily, we are not entities among 
other entities, we are meaning-constituting beings. The worldhood of the world in 
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which we reside is based on the experiential framework presupposed for any 
meaningful experience.  
We shall not get genuine knowledge of essences simply by the syncretic activity of 
universal comparison and classification. Subjecting the manifold to tabulation does 
not ensure any actual understanding of what lies there before us as thus set in order. 
[…] And if the “world” itself is something constitutive for Dasein, one must have an 
insight into Dasein‟s basic structures in order to treat the world-phenomenon 
conceptually.
128
 
From a phenomenological perspective we must therefore view empirical 
investigations with suspicion, with regard to their foundational validity. In the sense 
of an ontical study of entities amongst other entities, our first glance at dementia was 
perfectly adequate, but in relation to our more fundamental nature as pre-theoretical 
creatures absorbed in a the world, the examination of us as mere entities cannot be 
considered adequate. For this we need an ontological examination. As Heidegger puts 
it: “In ontological Interpretation an entity is to be laid bare with regard to its own state 
of Being; such an investigation obliges us first to give a phenomenal characterisation 
of the entity we have take as our theme[…].”129 The entity we have taken as our 
theme is in this case the self with dementia, and we will therefore precede to examine, 
based on the ontological constitution of Dasein, dementia with regard to its own state 
of being.   
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6: Dasein and dementia 
“Sweet memory, the unreliable handmaiden of the past” – (DeBaggio p.7) 
6.1 Dasein and dementia: methodology 
Before going on with our investigation of Dasein and dementia, we must pause to 
consider our methodology. In short, how and on what grounds can we use the 
phenomenological framework of Dasein for the comprehension of dementia? In brief, 
the methodology employed is based on Heidegger‟s understanding of ontology. He 
states that “Ontological investigation is a possible kind of interpreting, which we have 
described as the working-out and appropriation of an understanding.”130 Therefore we 
must conduct an examination of our previous understanding of dementia, as stated in 
chapter 2, and interpret it in light of the ontology of Dasein presented above. We will 
use our examination of dementia as pointing to aspects of the underlying conception 
being-in-the-world.  
Now, what can the Heideggerian conception of the self as Dasein tell us about what 
happens to the self with dementia? In the previous chapter we saw how the holisitic 
structure of being-in-the-world, and the existentials, can be used as a model for the 
self seen as the holistic underlying conditions of our experiential vantage point 
through which we experience the world. Firstly, we will utilise this conception of the 
self, in relation to our survey of the dementia diseases and symptoms. Then we will 
compare this model with the conceptions of the self suffering from dementia 
examined in chapters 3 and 4, before discussing its explanatory value. 
But before turning to our investigation of the symptoms we must ask one more 
question about the methodology. Why should our survey of dementia and Heidegger 
not suffer from the same criticisms as Heidegger made of the psychology and biology 
of his time? Well, it does appear that our introduction to dementia, and the 
neurological causes, did indeed investigate the person and the brain as entities among 
other entities. In that sense, our previous understanding, as stated in chapter 2, must 
indeed be seen as ontical, and while bringing forth many answers when it comes to 
characterising, and categorising dementia diseases, and their neurological causes, we 
have still not, from a Heideggerian perspective, arrived at an understanding of the 
Being of someone with dementia. One might indeed say that our survey in chapter 2 
                                                        
130
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 275. 
51 
 
uncovered present-to-hand ontical information, but does not give us an understanding 
of the meaning of Dasein with dementia, in other words, of the underlying 
experiential changes involved when suffering from dementia. So, what implications 
will an ontological investigation of dementia have for our understanding of a self with 
dementia? 
6.2 An ontological investigation of memory 
Before going on to examine the existentials in relation to dementia, we will first 
attempt to arrive at an ontological understanding of the defining symptom of 
dementia, memory. More precisely, what would be the implications of applying an 
ontical/ontological distinction to the cognitive capacity of memory? Well, as we have 
seen above, while memory initially seems to be a quite straightforward cognitive 
capacity, it is actually based on complex mental processes that interact with many 
different parts of the brain. From an ontical point of view, we might consider memory 
as the capacity to remember facts and capabilities. However, in Heidegger‟s Being 
and Time memory as such is not discussed explicitly. This, however, should not 
discourage us, for, as we remember, part of Heidegger‟s approach was to use new 
terms and conceptual frameworks in order to avoid the underlying assumptions of 
previous philosophical frameworks, which may even be inherent in our way of 
thinking. So, in order to understand memory as an integral part of our existential 
constitution, we must seek an understanding of what role memory might play for 
Dasein. In short, we must try to relate our previous understanding of memory with the 
ontological understanding of the self as being-in-the-world.  
As Heidegger used the present-at-hand, ready-to-hand distinction in order to 
exemplify the difference between an ontical and ontological investigation, we shall 
proceed along the same path in relation to memory. Now, as we discussed in our 
initial examination of memory as such, memory is often from a psychological and 
psychiatric perspective divided up into three types: procedural memory, working-
memory, and long-term memory. Let us examine these categories in turn. 
First, let us take procedural memory. Procedural memory is “reflected in skills and 
actions.”131 These skills and actions might include the capability of driving a car, 
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typing on a keyboard, eating or hammering a nail. The key distinguishing feature 
seems to be that we are not explicitly conscious of how we are doing the action in 
question, merely that we are doing it. At first glance this category of memory seems 
to indicate Heidegger‟s thoughts about how Dasein is involved pre-theoretically in 
within-the-world. Or in Heidegger‟s terms,  “the peculiarity of what is proximally 
ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw […] in 
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.”132  
Procedural memory can be affected by dementia in a variety of ways. Primarily due to 
dyspraxia: “[…] the failure to carry out complex motor tasks due to deficits in the 
higher cortical control of movement.”133 This can in clinical practise typically be 
observed by a patient struggling to brush their teeth or get dressed. Now, this would 
correspond to an ontical analysis, but what underlying ontological changes in our self, 
if any, might be implied by such a cognitive defect?  Well, in the case of procedural 
memory, it can be argued that our common ready-to-hand involvement in the world 
has been altered by an underlying degeneration of the brain. From the perspective of 
Dasein, this affects our circumspective involvement in the world. In these instances 
we can be fully aware of the in-order-to, the purpose, of the action, but are impeded 
by the breakdown of the “ready-to-hand” as such; our ability to deal with equipment. 
It seems as though the experiential dimension of the self is preserved, but the ready-
to-hand procedural activity, becomes an explicit present-to-hand theoretical problem. 
In other words, our involvement in the world is still there as a framework, but we 
become unable to be involved in the same manner. Getting dressed becomes an 
intellectual activity. 
This seeming breakdown in our ready-to-hand involvement can be contrasted with 
what Heidegger says about how our ready-to-hand involvement in the world can 
break down when equipment is missing or broken. As Heidegger states in Being and 
Time such a situation shows our circumspective involvement in the world, it shows 
that our primordial involvement in the world is equipmental. We do not primarily 
encounter entities amongst others, but rather things we use for a purpose. When we 
encounter these items of equipment we are not aware of them as such, rather we are 
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aware of the purpose of our actions. Indeed, taken strictly there are no items of 
equipment, merely a “totality of equipment […] constituted by various ways of the 
“in-order-to”, such as servicability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.“134 
When equipment is missing or broken our involvement in the world is lit up by its 
absence: “When its usability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous.”135  
This breakdown ties in with our second basic psychological category of memory: 
short-term memory. Indeed, the absence of equipment often happens when suffering 
from dementia, as the degeneration of short-term memory leads to many situations 
when items are found to be missing. In these situations there is no breakdown in our 
ready-to-hand involvement as such, but rather increased occurrences of breakdowns 
due to our diminished capacity to keep track of things. In instances such as this a 
degeneration of brain cells, often due to damage to the hippocampal region,
136
 leads to 
an increased frequencies whereby one is unable to be involved in our normal “non-
thematic circumspective absorption in references and assignments constitutive for the 
readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment.”137 In this second sense then we see a 
typical breakdown in the ready-to-hand involvement in the world, with increased 
frequency due to neurological degeneration, as opposed to the problems with 
conducting complex motor-tasks whereby our ready-to-hand involvement as such 
appears limited. Moreover, in many such instances, one can argue that items of 
equipment come across as un-ready-to-hand, whereby the totality of references 
remain, but items of equipment are pre-theoretically found to be missing.  
So, the correlation between degeneration of procedural and short-term memory, and 
Dasein results on the face of it not in the absence or degeneration of our experiential 
self, but rather in a change within the experiential dimension. This change can be 
characterised as relating to Dasein´s overall constitution as being-in-the-world, 
constituting a diminished ability for involvement: “The helpless way in which we 
stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-
present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand.”138  
                                                        
134
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 97. 
135
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 102. 
136
 Thomas and O´Brian, “Alzheimer´s Disease”, 512. 
137
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 107. 
138
 Ibid,103. 
54 
 
Furthermore, these deficits in our mode of concern affect our primordial relation to 
the world, as one of a holistic totality of equipment. There is an increased frequency 
of instances whereby Dasein with dementia is not involved in our primordial 
referential totality, but where our pre-theoretical absorption lights up: “Our 
circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the 
missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for.”139  
Moving on to long-term memory, more particularly our capacity for declarative 
memory, often called “factual knowledge,” which is often distinguished in the 
psychological and psychiatric literature into episodic memory, events that we have 
experienced, and semantic memory, our repertoire of general knowledge.
140
 What 
correlation can here be found between Dasein and their ontical, psychological 
description? In other words, what are the implications for the experiential 
phenomenological self of a loss of such types of memories? For an understanding of 
this we must turn to what Heidegger says about the “world” in which Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world resides. The category of declarative memory corresponds well to 
Heidegger‟s first meaning of world: “the totality of entities which can be present 
present-at-hand within the world.”141 The knowledge of such entities would ontically 
speaking correspond to our psychological category of semantic memories. However, 
as we saw in our previous deliberations such knowledge is derivative of our 
primordial concern within the world. So, we must ask what is the ontological basis for 
our ontical knowledge of the world. 
As we have already seen, the basis for entities seen as present-at-hand is ready-to-
hand, wherein there strictly speaking is no such thing as an item of equipment but 
rather an equipmental totality. In the similar vein Heidegger argues that ontically 
speaking the world corresponds to a totality of entities, as an ontological-existential 
concept “world” designates the concept of “worldhood”.142 This worldhood is not a 
feature of an independently existing sphere of entities, but “it is rather characteristic 
of Dasein itself.”143 So, the world ontologically understood refers back to Dasein. Our 
distinction between entities and our selves is as such based on our more primordial 
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pre-theoretical involvement in the world. Semantic memory can therefore be seen as 
derivative of our circumspective involvement in the world. In short, semantic facts are 
based on our involvement within-the-world, where the world is not seen as a separate 
sphere of entities, but rather as the fabric of our existence. Furthermore, this fabric 
can be seen as explicit involvement in our pre-theoretical understanding of the world, 
as will be exemplified by our discussion of the existential of understanding below. 
6.3 The existentials and dementia symptoms 
As we saw above the existential constitution of Dasein can be explained by the four 
existentials state-of-mind, understanding, discourse and falling. We will now turn to 
these in turn, and discuss them in relation to dementia symptoms.  
Firstly, let us look at the existential of “state-of-mind”, often referred to as mood. 
According to Heidegger we ontically come across this existential frequently in that 
we find ourselves in a particular mood; being angry, sad or stressed. However, 
ontologically speaking state-of-mind refers to our being attuned to the world in a 
particular way, whereby aspects of the world matter to us. Heidegger brought our 
attention to this when he stated that Dasein always finds itself “thrown” into the 
world, always being attuned in some way or another.  
In our initial examination of dementia we came across behavioural symptoms, such as 
depression, anxiety, changing personality, apathy, restlessness, irritability, and 
aggression. Furthermore, these behavioural symptoms were shown to relate to 
underlying neurological causes, such as the diminished production of 
neurotransmitters or fronto-temporal degeneration, and often coinciding with 
increased cognitive impairment.
144
 Now, on the face of it what we observe here are 
ontical changes; the theoretical observation of entities. However, they also draw our 
attention to the way in which we always find ourselves always disclosed to the world 
in a certain manner. However, what do these behavioural alterations mean for the 
Dasein with dementia, in relation to the existential of state-of-mind? 
Well, rather than understanding behavioural changes as “merely” psychological 
alterations, we should attempt to interpret them as indicating our existential 
constitution. Furthermore, rather than indicating any deterioration of the self, these 
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behavioural changes draw our attention to our ontological constitution: “Any 
cognitive determining has its existential-ontological Constitution in the state-of-mind 
of Being-in-the-world; but pointing this out is not to be confused with attempting to 
surrender science ontically to “feeling”.”145 These behavioural changes should 
therefore not be discounted as merely psychological alterations, but interpreted within 
the holistic framework of being-in-the-world as belonging to our very directionality 
within-the-world. In other words, we all still attuned, but the alterations in the manner 
in which we are attuned bring out the underlying neurological involvement in such a 
state-of-mind. The experiential framework seems to remain the same, but the effects 
of neurological degeneration lead to alterations in how we are attuned. For example, 
in the frequent case of apathy, the worldhood of our experience can be altered in that 
whatever we come across is not a matter of concern. However, just as an ontical study 
of the behavioural symptoms of dementia show us that cognitive, motoric and 
cognitive symptoms influence each other, the existential constitution of Dasein, 
shows us the interrelation of the existentials. So, in the same way that the loss of 
cognitive capacities can lead to apathy, an altered attunement within-the-world, 
causally linked to neurological degeneration, can lead to a change in our  
interpretation of the whole experiential dimension.  
Secondly, we must  turn to the existential of understanding. As Heidegger puts it 
“Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein´s own potentiality-for-Being; and it 
is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.”146 
In other words, understanding is based on interpreting our possibilities, grounded in 
our involvement in the world. This understanding is always based on a fore-
conception: 
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a “signification” over some naked thing which is 
present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is 
encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in 
our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the 
interpretation.
147
 
But what are the implications of the understanding as interpretation for our ontology 
of Dasein with dementia? We do not theoretically appropriate our fore-having, fore-
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conception and fore-sight, rather such an appropriation is inherent in our 
understanding of anything. However, presupposing, as we are, the embodiment of the 
mind, these features of interpretation must have a place in the brain. In order to grasp 
something in advance, we need to have a fore-conception, this conception 
corresponds on an ontical level to the cognitive faculty of memory. But, ontologically 
speaking memory is not a mere cognitive faculty, but constitutes the fabric of the 
worldhood of the world. So, in the case of Being with dementia, amnesia in its 
various forms does not merely result in forgetting things, but rather alters the fabric of 
the world, and as such also alters the possibilities of future interpretation. So, the 
environmental pre-theoretical totality within which one finds oneself is altered. 
Categories alter, care-givers and family can find themselves interpreted as being 
someone different, or not even recognised. These misinterpretations do therefore not 
constitute a degeneration of the self, but rather an altered interpretation of the world, 
whereby the experiential dimension remains the same, but the parameters for 
interpretation change, with neurological degeneration.   
These alterations to our understanding can be most pertinently exemplified by two 
other symptoms of dementia, delusions and hallucinations. These symptoms of 
dementia are psychologically described as related to a problem with distinguishing 
between imagined thoughts and factual, and seeing things which are not there. 
However, from an ontological perspective there is case to be made that these things 
are there in a very real sense; as part of the worldhood of the world for someone 
suffering from dementia. This is often found in clinical practise, particularly in the 
case of paranoia, whereby it is often more conducive not to discount or attempt to 
disprove a patient‟s delusions but rather to act along with them, in other words 
appropriate the worldhood of the world within which the patient resides.  
Thirdly, we will  turn to the existential of discourse. As we saw in the previous 
chapter this is where Heidegger introduces language. But rather then understanding 
discourse ontically as a collection of words and syntax; ontologically discourse 
signifies our primordial ready-to-hand intelligible understanding within the world: “In 
discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world [an intelligibility which goes with a 
state-of-mind) is articulated according to significations and discourse is this 
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articulation.”148 But how does this relate to our examination of the symptoms of 
dementia?  
The cognitive symptom of dementia that is most pertinently related to discourse is 
aphasia: “Deficits in cortical language production […]”149. Aphasia is observed in a 
patient having problems with finding the correct words for things, syntactical errors 
and repetition of simple sentences. “The development of these deficits has serious 
consequences as the patient now increasingly struggles to understand what is going on 
around him and to communicate his distress and confusion clearly to others.”150 
Furthermore, as dementia progresses patients suffering in clinical practise can start 
repeating simple sentences, sounds and even babbling meaninglessly.
151
 So, ontically 
one can observe diminished capacity to communicate and comprehend. So, how does 
this relate to the ontology of Dasein? 
In relation to the existential of discourse this degeneration of language ability can be 
seen as deterioration of the co-understanding of being-in-the-world. Indeed, as the 
degeneration of the underpinning neurological constitution of Dasein develops there 
seems to be a deterioration in the possibility for discourse.  And, although Heidegger 
argues that “keeping silent” is a category of discourse, this keeping-silent must be 
based in co-understanding: “Only he who already understands can listen.”152 Indeed, 
in this instance it seems that the existential of discourse can be diminished by 
neurological degeneration, leading to a diminished co-understanding in the world.  
However, there is no clear cut-off point here. Often co-understanding remains even 
though the capacity to produce sentences is diminished. This can be observed in 
clinical practise when a patient expresses exasperation at not being able to 
communicate properly. In this instance some co-understanding remains, and although 
the coherent expression of this co-understanding is not possible, we must remember 
that discourse does not only involve words and syntax. In short, in relation to 
existential of discourse we can in the case of dementia, see a deterioration of part of 
the framework of the phenomenological self, due to a loss of a co-understanding of 
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being-in-the-world. However, there seems to be no clear boundary here, signifying 
the loss of the self, but rather a gradual decline in co-understanding.  
Now, the last existential we will examine is falling. As we remember falling is linked 
to “idle talk”, the passing on of non-appropriated statements in discourse, and “the 
they” a way in which Dasein pre-theoretically takes on the role of the consensus. 
“Dasein itself , in idle talk and in the way things have been publicly interpreted, 
presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in the “they” and falling into 
groundlessness. This tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation 
towards falling.”153 In short, as “idle talk” signifies a natural passing over of 
significance in discourse, falling can be seen as an “idle” pattern of being; crudely 
put, mindlessly going about the business of living. In what way does this fourth 
existential tie in with Dementia? 
The implications of dementia for the fourth existential of Dasein, falling, do not seem 
to be indicated by either of the cognitive, behavioural and motoric symptoms taken in 
isolation. Indeed, the scientific observations leave two distinct avenues of 
interpretation available. In one sense one could argue that apathy, and mindless 
babbling due to speech problems, point at increased frequency of losing oneself in 
mindless conformity. On the other hand, the diminished capacity of co-understanding 
due to ready-to-hand language difficulties, and the diminished parameters for 
interpretation, could indicate an inability to engage in mindless conformity. However, 
this ambiguity is not a failure of explanation, rather an exemplification of the many 
underlying factors involved: the varying dementia diseases, environmental 
contributions and individual differences.  
6.4 Dementia, the self and Dasein: explanatory value 
From the specific, we must now move on to the general; what overall implications 
does the discussion above have for our understanding of the self with dementia? The 
overall constitution of Dasein is given by the existentials, though these must always 
be understood as constituting a structural whole. In the same way, as the ontical 
observation of psychological symptoms showed that the symptoms, cognitive, 
behavioural and motoric, interact and influence each other, the existentials of Dasein 
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constitute a structural whole. However, whereas the purpose of the medical and 
psychological study of dementia aims at categorising and identifying causal links and 
characteristic features, with the aim to aid understanding, treatment and clinical 
practise, the ontological study of Dasein and dementia seeks to understand dementia 
as an aspect of an experiential totality; as a way of experiencing the world.  
Heidegger states that the holistic framework of being-in-the-world can described by 
care: “The meaning of thins Being – that is, of care – is what makes care possible in 
its Constitution; and it is what makes primordially the Being of this potentiality-for-
Being.”154 Indeed, in the previous chapter we saw that this overall constitution of care 
was discussed with reference to existentials: state-of-mind, understanding, discourse 
and falling. Now, on the basis of this we can already draw some conclusions as to the 
implications of Dasein with dementia.  
Firstly, as the self, so understood, pertains to the experiential dimension, and not a 
category of self-identity or self-understanding, it cannot be an all or nothing matter, it 
would be nonsensical within this theoretical framework to speak of a loss of self, due 
to dementia. As opposed to Lowe and Luntley‟s arguments, who are particularly 
influenced by Locke and Kant and argue that the loss of a self can be understood in 
reference to a key human capacity, the self does not have one key feature, but is rather 
given as holistic framework of experience, and as such cannot merely cease to be. The 
parameters for interpreting experience alter, and in the case of discourse may even 
appear to cease to function to large extent, but all in all the experiential framework 
remains the same.  
As the parameters for interpretation alter, due to neurological degeneration, the world 
of the person suffering from dementia changes. Deficits in procedural memeory, 
indicate on an ontical level an underlying ontological change, ready-to-hand 
involvement within-the-world becomes problematic as motoric changes make us 
unable to use the items of equipment pre-theoretically available to us, and problems 
with short-term memory hinders us from accessing the holistic totality of equipment 
normally readily available to us. This increases the number of moments where the 
inherent referential assignments of the within-the-world are lost, and one falls out of 
context.  
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When it comes to deficits in long-term memory, this points on the ontological level to 
a change in the world in which we reside. On an ontological level long-term memory 
is related to the neurological underpinnings for our fabric of reality. And as these 
neurological foundations falter, the very fabric of reality alters; the whole world 
changes shape. This alteration of reality ties in with the existential of understanding, 
for as any understanding is based on interpretation, and the brain is the material 
foundation for any interpretation, the parameters of interpretation for a person 
suffering for dementia change, and one comes at odds with other within-the-world 
interpretations.  
As for the existential of state-of-mind, the experiential dimension of being attuned to 
the world does not seem to change in the case of dementia, but rather behavioural 
symptoms indicate that the manner in which this attunement takes form is especially 
susceptible to neurological degeneration. Dasein with dementia can experience that 
the emotive fabric of reality alters. For example the behavioural symptom of paranoia, 
indicates on an ontological lever, not a mere fault in interpretation, but a particularly 
strong concern of one´s environmental surroundings.  
In light of the existential of falling, underlying cognitive symptoms of dementia can 
indicate both an inability to pre-theoretical absorb “the they” and an increased 
frequency of mindless passing over of information. Indeed, this last existential points 
tothe complexities involved in the constitution of the self.  
We can now see that Heidegger´s model of the self offers us a view of the 
implications of dementia for the holistic structure of experience. Indeed, rather than 
explaining dementia by way of a number of cognitive deficits; emphasising disunity 
with a “normal” way of viewing the world, the phenomenological self gives us the 
methodological tools to examine dementia as something altering our experiential 
interpretation of the world. As such this interpretation allows us to avoid addressing 
problems such a subject/object distinction, questions concerning whether something is 
real or not real, which are clearly not involved in our normal environmental 
engagement within the world 
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7:  Conclusion 
“Neurology‟s favourite word is “deficit”, denoting an impairment or 
incapacity of neurological function: loss of speech, loss of language, loss of 
memory, loss of vision, loss of dexterity, loss of identity, and a myriad other 
lacks and losses of specific functions (or faculties).”155   
So, in sum what can we conclude regarding the self and dementia? Firstly, that 
dementia is not a simple construction. It includes a great variety of diseases, which 
themselves vary vastly in symptoms and degrees. Furthermore, the psychiatric and 
psychological description of dementia is also complicated by individual variation and 
environmental factors. However, in sum the mainstream scientific description of 
dementia aims at characterising and categorising mental deficits due to neurological 
degeneration. 
Secondly, that there are a vast variety of views on the self, which, to varying degrees 
of success, and emphasising varying aspects of dementia, have been used to question 
whether or not the self endures as dementia progresses. In chapter 3   we considered 
two models for viewing the self. Broadly speaking these revolved around whether, 
according to the identity view, the self is based on one cognitive characteristic as a 
foundational feature, or whether the self was a fictional construction. While we 
should avoid oversimplification (indeed, Locke and Kant did of course acknowledge 
external influences on the mind), the important thing to note is that it was the internal 
collection of ideas in the mind and the fundamental feature of “I think” accompanying 
any idea,  which were seen as foundationally constituting the self. In this sense both 
views were seen as exemplifying aspects of dementia, but fell short of any 
comprehensive value in explaining dementia as an aspect of the self. Indeed, this was 
reflected in the vague conclusions reached. Moving on we saw how a no-self view 
avoided the conception of the self all together, but had little explanatory value. As to 
the external view, we saw that the narrative view of the self provided a framework 
within which certain aspects of dementia could be explained, but no overall 
theoretical framework from which to attempt an understanding of what it means to 
live with dementia. For this we had to turn to phenomenology. 
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Now, it will be to surprise to anyone who has read this far that my particular 
preference is the use of phenomenology in the exploration of the self. For through a 
phenomenological understanding we can grasp some vague core, which explains the 
intricate relationships and aspects of our experience as  human beings, 
Phenomenology provides us with a framework which both discloses our core, with the 
holistic framework of our existentials - mirroring a holistic interpretation of our brain 
- and explains our urge towards ontical interpretations; classifying, dividing and 
defining.  
As dementia progresses, accompanied by the neurological degeneration of the brain, 
we can see that although the structural features of our situatedness within-the-world 
remain the same, as the holistic structure of being-in-the-world; the parameters within 
these structures alter. Moreover, they alter to the extent that with severe language 
problems, the co-understanding with the rest of humanity is reduced beyond 
comparison. Indeed, this is reflected in the very real concern for suffering from such a 
devastating illness, the anxiety for the shattering fabric of the world one normally 
finds oneself embedded in. However, there is a definite sense in which the self 
remains permanent, when phenomenologically interpreted as the experiential 
framework of experience. And, as such the experiential framework of Dasein helps us 
understand what it means to live with dementia. As opposed to the identity conception 
of the self, and the no-self conception, the phenomenological conception of the self 
has greater explanatory value: one can attempt to comprehend the experiential 
realities involved in living with dementia. In regard to the narrative conception of the 
self; the theoretical framework of the phenomenological self offers a structural unity 
of interpretation which the narrative view lacks.  
In the introduction I stated that one of the premises for this philosophical 
interpretation of dementia was that progress made in the empirical study of mind, in 
the areas of neurology, psychiatry and psychology, should have profound implications 
for the philosophical theory of the self. Coming round full circle. I believe, based on 
the examination above, I have shown that the opposite is also the case: the theoretical 
structure of the self has been shown to necessitate a foundational study of the 
empirical study of mind. Nowhere is this more pertinent than in the psychology and 
neurology of dementia. While being very aptly formed, and conducted, in order to 
characterise deficits of as cognitive, behavioural and motoric impairments, the 
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empirical sciences of mind have much less to say about what it means to live with 
dementia.  
Furthermore, I believe that the use of phenomenology as a methodological tool to 
understand and critically examine the foundations of psychiatry, psychology and 
neurology is a growing.  Among several recent theorists who discuss the applications 
of phenomenological interpretation of psychiatric problems we find Matthew 
Ratcliffe. In ”Understanding existential changes in psychiatric illness: The 
indispensability of phenomenology” he makes that case that phenomenology is 
essential in order to understand structures of experience often presupposed in 
scientific study. On the basis of an examination of depression he writes that: “The 
phenomenologist studies aspects of experience that are presupposed by all empirical, 
scientific investigation into what the world contains. One cannot distinguish between 
what is and is not the case in the world without having a sense of what is to be the 
case.”156 
In a similar vein I have argued that in order to comprehend dementia philosophically 
we must take a step back from the study of entities to the study of experiential 
dimension for someone suffering from dementia. Indeed, as we have seen scientific 
study and philosophical theory on the subject of dementia can be mutually 
illuminating. In particular, the symptoms of dementia point to a fundamental change 
in the parameters for the interpretation of the world in which the sufferer resides.  
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